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Valuation Effects of Earnings Restatements
Due to Accounting Irregularities
ABSTRACT
Tan Xu 
Old Dominion University 
Director: Dr. Mohammed Najand
This dissertation studies three financial topics using earnings restatement data. In the first topic, 
we discriminate between the market efficiency hypothesis and the underreaction hypothesis by 
examining their predictions on the stock performance of restating firms in the post-announcement 
period. Three approaches are used, namely, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR), and calendar time portfolio approaches. Consistent with the market 
efficiency hypothesis, we do not find significant abnormal performance in the post-restatement 
period. In the second topic, we test the extrapolation model (LSV, 1994) by examining the 
relationship between stock price reaction to earnings restatement and the glamour/value stock 
characteristics. We illustrate that depending on whether investors change their naive expectation 
strategy, there are two possible stock price reaction patterns. Our results do not support the naive 
extrapolation model. In the third topic, we test whether earnings restatement has contagion effect 
and competitive effect. The results are mixed: we find intra-industry effect and the effect varies by 
industry characteristics using the regression method while we find no such effect using the 
stratification method. Besides the three topics, this dissertation documents some characteristics of 
restating firms in the sample period, including the book-to-market (BM) ratio, market 
capitalization, and leverage.
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11. Introduction
The finance literature has examined various corporate events and uses these evidences to test 
financial hypotheses. Nevertheless, earnings restatements are rarely seen in the finance literature 
although they are intensively studied by the accounting literature. This lack of interest by the 
finance literature might be because earnings restatements are not as frequent as other events. For 
instance, according to the US General Accounting Office (GAO), the proportion of publicly traded 
companies restating financial statements due to accounting irregularities is 0.89 percent in 1997 
and less than 3 percent in 2002, the historic height. Before 1997, the number of earnings 
restatement is much smaller.
Nevertheless, studies on earnings restatements can provide new insights into some financial 
topics because of the unique characteristics of earnings restatements. Earnings restatement is one 
of the results of companies’ improper accounting practice. Like the other corporate events, 
earnings restatement ignites stock price movement around the announcement day. In other words, 
it conveys information regarding the firm value. Earnings and dividend announcements revise 
investors’ valuation of the firm if the new earnings or dividend figures are different from the 
market expectation. Earnings restatement reveals that the firm’s actual earnings are different from 
what it previously stated. If Investors form their expectation of the firm’s earnings prospect based 
on the firm’s past performance, earnings restatement can be considered as an earnings surprise. On 
the other hand, earnings surprises do not revise the companies’ earnings history while earnings 
restatements do. The revision of companies’ earnings history can cause investors to investigate the 
restating firms more thoroughly. This investigation can lead to changes in investor behavior. Thus, 
we can test whether investor behavior affect stock prices by investigating the stock price reaction 
to earnings restatement announcements.
Although extant studies on earnings restatements focus on those caused by accounting
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2irregularities1, a company might also restate its financial statement for legitimate reasons, such as 
stock splits, merger and acquisitions, or changes in accounting principles. Earnings restatements 
due to legitimate reasons should not have material impact on the firm value under the assumption 
that investors can “see” the company’s real earnings, regardless of the accounting method used, as 
long as appropriate disclosures are made (Friedlob and Schleifer, 2003). Thus, we only examine 
earnings restatements due to accounting irregularities. Hereafter, all the earnings restatements in 
this dissertation refer to those caused by accounting irregularities. The definition of accounting 
irregularities varies in different studies. This study adopts the definition made by GAO (2002), i.e., 
it is “an instance in which a company restates its financial statements because they were not fairly 
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). This would 
include material errors and fraud” (pp. 2)
This dissertation covers three topics. First, we discriminate between the market efficiency 
hypothesis and the underreaction hypothesis by testing the post-announcement long-run stock 
price performance of the restating firms. The market efficiency hypothesis predicts no abnormal 
return on average in the post-announcement period while the underreaction hypothesis predicts 
negative abnormal return in that period. Earnings restatements might lead to class action lawsuits, 
management shuffle, and restructuring, adding to the uncertainty of the firm. Consequently, it is 
more difficult to predict the firm’s future after earnings restatement. Examining the stock price 
performance of restating firms following earnings restatement announcements can provide 
evidence on how well do investors price stocks. Prior studies on the stock price performance 
following earnings restatement announcements support the underreaction hypothesis. However, all 
these studies examine only the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of restating firms in the 
post-announcement periods. Recent studies show that although CAR approach has many
1 It is recently criticized by some researchers that the term “accounting irregularities” cannot correctly reflect the 
intentional wrongdoing of corporate executives. However, there is no agreement on a new term that has the similar 
meanings and coverage as the “accounting irregularities” used in lots of prior studies. To be comparable to these studies, 
this study keeps using the “accounting irregularities” and leaves it to the accounting researchers to decide a better 
substitute.
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3advantages, it cannot precisely reflect investors’ experience. Various methodologies have been 
proposed to measure long-run stock price performance. Since no single approach solves all the 
measurement biases problems, we use three major approaches, namely, the CAR, the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR), and the calendar time portfolio approach. Our empirical results suggest 
stocks of restating firms do not underperform or outperform the market in the year following the 
announcement day.
In the second topic, we investigate the stock price reaction to earnings restatement 
announcements to test the naive extrapolation hypothesis proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1994). It 
is well documented that value stocks outperform glamour stocks. However, the reason why this 
return differential persists is unclear. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that this return differential is 
caused by investors’ naive extrapolation of companies’ past performance. Although hypotheses on 
investor behavior are appealing, there are still debates on whether and how investor behavior 
influences stock prices. As is discussed before, earnings restatements can be used to test investor 
behavior hypotheses because it can change investor behavior. This dissertation shows that the 
naive extrapolation hypothesis predicts two possible relations between the stock price reaction and 
the glamour/value stock characteristics depending on whether investors change their naive 
extrapolation behavior upon the announcement of earnings restatement. Our empirical results, 
however, do not support the predictions of the naive extrapolation hypothesis.
The third topic concerns whether a company’s earnings restatement influences the equity 
value of its rivals. There is no empirical study on the effects of earnings restatement on the equity 
value of the restating firm’s rivals. Three perspectives have been provided by different studies.
The first perspective, suggested by the intra-industry information transfer literature, is that 
earnings restatements should have no negative contagion effect but might have positive 
competitive effect. A notion proposed by Aharony and Swary (1983) and endorsed by Lang and 
Stulz (1992) and others is that if a bank failure is caused by purely idiosyncratic reasons, such as 
fraud, then no contagion effect occurs. Since accounting irregularities are usually believed to be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4due to factors specific to the committing firms, earnings restatements should have no contagion 
effect. On the other hand, the information transfer literature documents that the competitive effect 
may exist in various corporate events, such as bankruptcy announcements (Lang and Stulz, 1992), 
open market share repurchase announcements (Erwin and Miller, 1998), and dividend 
announcements (Laux et al., 1998). The competitive effect may arise if an earnings restatement 
enables competitors to prey on the restating firm because earnings restatement weakens it or 
simply reveals that it is weaker than it appeared to be.
The second perspective, popular on Wall Street, is that accounting irregularities could spell 
trouble for competitors because investors might consider the problems as widespread in the 
restating firm’s industry and, thus, lower their expectation of the profitability of the industry; 
financing could dry up; the authorities might launch investigation on the industry; firms in the 
industry might have to advertise their creditworthiness. For example, Wall Street Journal (Barta, 
2004-01-12) reports that Freddie Mac’s earnings restatement raised new questions about the 
quality of Fannie Mae’s financial reporting; the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO) launched an inquiry into Fannie Mae’s accounting to ensure it did not manipulate 
earnings like Freddie Mac.
The third perspective, provided by some accounting studies, is that an outbreak of accounting 
scandals can depress investor confidence and, thus, have negative impacts on the entire stock 
market. GAO (2002) reports that several survey-based indices of investor sentiment, such as the 
monthly UBS/Gallup index, suggest investor confidence was dragged down by the concern over 
corporate accounting practices in some months during the early 2000s. However, Wu (2002) 
documents that the earnings response coefficient of the restating firms decreases following 
earnings restatement announcements but not that of the peer firms (matched by 2-digit SIC code). 
Overall, the loss of confidence to a firm’s earnings quality does not appear to spillover to other 
firms. Thus, studies arguing that the effects of earnings restatements on the stock market by 
depressing investor confidence seem to suggest earnings restatements have negative impacts on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5the entire stock market only when accounting scandals become severe and widespread.
We test the effects of earnings restatement announcements on the restating firm’s rivals by 
examining their contagion effect and competitive effect. Overall, our results suggest that earnings 
restatement announcements do not significantly influence the equity value of the restating firms’ 
rivals.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses relevant literature on the three 
topics. Section 3 develops hypotheses for tests. Section 4 describes the sample and methodologies. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the dissertation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62. Literature Review
2.1. Long-run Post-event Stock Price Performance
The market efficiency hypothesis suggests that security prices folly reflect all available 
information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information do not exceed the 
marginal costs (Jensen, 1978). Examining the long-run stock price performance is an important 
way to test this hypothesis. The market efficiency hypothesis predicts that stocks have no 
abnormal return in the long run. Nevertheless, empirical studies find substantial evidences that 
stocks have abnormal performance in the annul, three years, and five years following corporate 
events and decisions such as merger and acquisition, open market share repurchase, earnings and 
dividend announcement, initial public offering (IPO), season equity offering (SEO), dividend 
initiation and omission, and analyst recommendations1. These results are often cited as evidence 
against the market efficiency hypothesis. The underreaction hypothesis is a popular alternative to 
the market efficiency hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that investors treat corporate events 
with skepticism, leading stock prices to adjust slowly over time (e.g., Ikenberry et al., 1995).
Recent studies, however, suggest that the results of long-run abnormal returns should be 
interpreted with caution because they are severely misspecified. Misspecification can cause some 
methods to detect spurious anomalies. In other words, the empirical rates of rejecting the null 
hypothesis of zero mean abnormal return exceed theoretical rejection rate (e.g., Lyon et al., 1999; 
Kothari and Warner, 1997; Ball et al., 1995). To better understand why misspecification is a 
serious problem, it is necessary to review the methods used to detect long-run anomalies. Although 
there is substantial variation in the measures and test statistics of abnormal returns, there are three 
major approaches: the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) approach, buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAR) approach, and the calendar time portfolio approach. In the CAR approach, the 
abnormal performance is measured by the sum of either the daily or monthly abnormal returns
1 Please see Barber and Lyon (1997) and Fama and French (1998) for a review of the studies on long-run abnormal stock 
returns following corporate events or decisions.
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7over time (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985). The daily or monthly abnormal return is the difference 
between the actual return and a benchmark return, such as the predicted return estimated by the 
market model, the return of a reference portfolio or the return of a control firm. Beginning with 
Ritter (1991), the mean BHAR has become the most popular estimator of long-run abnormal 
returns (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). In this approach, the abnormal performance is measured by 
the buy-and-hold return (BHR) differential between the sample firm and a benchmark. The BHR is 
calculated by compounding the daily or monthly returns over the post-event period. The calendar 
time portfolio approach requires first forming a portfolio at the beginning of each calendar month 
containing firms that had an event within the last one-, three-, or five- year (depending on the 
purpose of the study) and then calculating their mean return. The monthly returns of the portfolios 
are then regressed on Fama and French’s (1993) three factors. The abnormal performance over the 
post-event period is measured by the intercept term of the model. Jaffe (1974), Mandelker (1974), 
Fama (1998), and Desi et al. (2002) use various forms of the calendar time portfolio approach. 
Fama (1998) suggests that the heteroskedasticity of the portfolio’s abnormal return caused by the 
changes through time the number of stocks in the portfolio can be solved by using the weighted 
least square (WLS) technique, i.e., using the number of stocks in the portfolio as the weight when 
running the regression.
The benchmark used to estimate the abnormal returns varies in many studies. A benchmark 
can be the return of a reference portfolio. The value-weighted and equal-weighted CRSP market 
indices are two conventional reference portfolios. A reference portfolios can also be the size, the 
book-to-market (BM) ratio, or /? portfolios. To form these portfolios, researchers first divides all 
the NYSE/ASE, and NASDAQ stocks into deciles by size, BM ratio, or /? in June or December 
each year. The number of deciles varies in different studies. Some studies, e.g., Barber and Lyon
(1997), divide firms into 50 deciles (10 size deciles by 5 BM ratio deciles). The return for each 
decile is calculated by averaging the returns of all stocks in the decile. Thus, a size-adjusted 
abnormal return is the return of the sample firm minus the average return of all the firms in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
same size decile. Since firms might change deciles only once a year, the benchmark return is 
equivalent to investing in an equal weighted decile portfolio with monthly rebalancing. The 
problem of monthly rebalancing benchmark will be discussed later in this section. A benchmark 
can also be the return of the control firm. The control firm is the firm that has similar 
characteristics as that of the sample firm. One way to identify the control firm is by first finding all 
firms with a market value between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm; the firm in this set 
and also has BM ratio closest to that of the sample firm is finally selected as the control firm. 
Another type of benchmark is derived from a variety of asset-pricing models, such as the market 
model and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. The intercept term in these models 
represents the abnormal return. Nevertheless, Ball et al. (1995) document that many popular 
asset-pricing models are misspecified and, thus, may cause problems when using them to measure 
long-run stock price performance.
Lyon et al. (1999), Fama (1998), and Barber and Lyon (1997) have discussed how different 
types of misspecification can cause biases in various measures of long-run abnormal performance. 
These measurement biases are: 1) the new listing bias. It arises because sample firms generally 
have a long post-event history of returns while the reference portfolio constitutes new firms that 
begin trading subsequent to the event month. Since new firms concentrate in small growth stocks 
which historically have lower returns than the market (Brav and Gompers, 1997), the return of the 
reference portfolio is artificially depressed relative to the sample firms. Thus, comparing the return 
of the sample firms with the benchmark return yields positively biased test statistics, i.e., making it 
more likely to reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns. On the other hand, if newly 
listed firms outperform the market, the test statistics will be downwardly biased; 2) the rebalancing 
bias. It arises since the return of a reference portfolio is calculated by compounding the equal 
weighted returns in each period while the returns of sample firms are compounded without 
rebalancing. The monthly rebalancing means that, at the beginning of each period, stocks that rise 
during the prior period (day or month) are reassigned the same weight as those drop during the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9prior period. This is equivalent to the strategy of selling a portion of the past winners and buying 
past losers. Since past winners empirically outperform past losers in the intermediate term due to 
momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), the long-run return of the reference portfolio is inflated 
relative to the sample firms, leading to a positive bias in measuring the long-run return of the 
sample firms. The magnitude of the rebalancing bias is more pronounced when using daily, rather 
than monthly, returns (Canina et al. 1996). The CAR approach does not subject to this bias since 
CAR is the sum of the difference between the returns of the sample firms and the market index; 3) 
the skewness bias. It arises because the long-run BHAR is positively skewed. When the test 
statistic is calculated by dividing the mean BHAR by the cross-sectional standard deviation of the 
sample firms, the positive skewness leads to a negative biased test statistic. The skewness bias is 
less serious in CAR approach because the monthly returns of sample firms are summed rather than 
compounded; 4) the cross-sectional dependence. It inflates test statistics because the number of 
sample firms overstates the number of independent observations. Two types of cross-sectional 
dependence are calendar clustering (e.g., many firms have the same event during the same day or 
month) and overlapping return calculations (e.g., a firm has the same event twice or more during 
the event period, say, one year). The calendar clustering might be driven by certain fundamental 
forces while the overlapping return might be driven by the firm characters. In both cases, the 
observations are not independent. While both the CAR and BHAR approaches suffer from this 
problem, the calendar-time portfolio approach eliminates this problem since the returns on sample 
firms are aggregated into the return of a single portfolio; 5) the bad model problem. Because all 
models for expected returns fail to completely describe the systematic patterns in average returns 
during any sample period (Fama, 1998), the estimate of the expected returns cannot be accurate, 
leading to spurious abnormal return which grows with the return horizon and eventually becomes 
statistically significant. The bad model problem is most acute with BHAR approach since the 
measurement error grows fast with compounding returns.
There is no panacea for all the above problems and no consensus on which approach is the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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best in measuring long-run performance. Fama (1998) prefers the CAR approach to the BHAR 
approach in testing market efficiency because the former is less susceptible to misspecification 
which is more severe when compounding daily or monthly returns. Nevertheless, Barber and Lyon 
(1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) show that the statistical problems of BHAR can be attenuated using 
elaborate techniques. Although the improved methods for BHAR produce inferences no more 
reliable than the simpler CAR method, the BHAR approach precisely measures investor 
experience and can answer the question of whether sample firms earn abnormal returns over a 
particular horizon of analysis and the CAR approach should be used to answer a slightly different 
question: do sample firms persistently earn abnormal monthly returns? Although the question is 
related, the CAR is a biased estimator of BHAR. Thus, they do not recommend the CAR approach; 
Barber and Lyon (1997) prefer BHAR with the control firm method to BHAR with the reference 
portfolio method since the former alleviates the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias, and the 
skewness bias; moreover, the matching firm method can be extended to include more firm 
characteristics, such as momentum, in addition to the firm size and BM ratio. Kothari and Warner
(1997) find that parametric test statistics, such as the BHAR with market model, or three-factor 
model, do not satisfy the assumptions of zero mean and unit normality. They suggest using the 
BHAR in conjunction with the pseudoportfolio approach proposed by Ikenberry et al. (1995) 
might reduce the misspecification. Lyon et al. (1999) advocate two approaches: 1) the BHAR 
approach using a carefully constructed reference portfolio, such as the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic or the pseudoportfolio approach; and 2) the calendar time portfolio 
approach. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) compare the measurement biases in these two approaches 
and suggest that the cross-sectional dependence problem is more severe than the violation of 
normality. The bootstrapping procedure assumes cross-sectional dependence and, thus, is not 
reliable. They recommend the calendar-time portfolio approach which assumes normality. Fama
(1998) strongly advocates the calendar-time portfolio approach since: 1) monthly returns are less 
susceptible to the bad model problem; 2) it accounts for the cross-sectional dependence problem;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and 3) the estimator is better approximated by the normal distribution, allowing for classical 
statistical inference. Nevertheless, the calendar-time portfolio approach does not reflect investors’ 
experience and has low power to detect abnormal performance since it averages over months of 
“hot” and “cold” event activity (Loughran and Ritter, 2000).
The results of long-run abnormal return might also be influenced by the low-priced stock 
effect. Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Ball et al. (1995) report that most of DeBondt and Thaler’s 
(1985) long-run overreaction findings can be attributed to a combination of bid-ask effect and the 
low-price effect, rather than prior return. Although Loughran and Ritter (1996) question the 
methodology used in both studies, the impact of low-price stocks might be important when the 
sample firms are extremely low-priced since micro-structure problems, such as larger bid-ask 
spread, might decrease market participants’ ability to capitalize on, and, thus, reduce the 
misvaluation in these stocks.
Prior studies on the post-announcement stock price performance of earning restatement 
exclusively rely on the CAR approach. Hirschey et al. (2003) use the market-adjusted, the 
market-model adjusted and the mean-adjusted CAR approaches. GAO (2002) uses the 
market-adjusted CAR approach. Wu (2002) uses the /?- and size- adjusted CAR approach. These 
studies document negative CAR in the months following the restatement announcement. For 
example, Wu (2002) observes over 10 percent negative CAR in the year following the 
announcement. She suggests two potential explanations: some firms fail to provide restated 
number at the same time as restatement announcements and leave the issue unconcluded; and 
investors keep revising their beliefs according to information received subsequently. Taken at face 
value, this evidence is consistent with the notion that market underreacts to earning restatement. 
However, the CAR approach does not provide a precise picture of investors’ experience and 
suffers from the cross-sectional dependence problem. Furthermore, recent empirical studies
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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increasingly consider the momentum effect1 when measuring long-run performance (e.g., Desi et 
al., 2002). Albeit several studies document that restating firms experienced stock price decline in 
the six months before restatement announcement (e.g., Hirschey et al., 2004; Wu, 2002), none has 
control for the momentum effect when measuring the long-run performance. Thus, more evidence, 
such as those from the BHAR approach and the calendar-time portfolio approach are needed to 
reliably support the underreaction hypothesis.
The most serious and unresolved problem in testing market efficiency with evidence from 
long-run stock price performance is the joint-hypothesis problem (Fama, 1998; Lyon et al., 1999). 
That is, the market efficiency must be tested jointly with some market model of equilibrium, an 
asset-pricing model. Thus, when we find return anomaly, we are not sure whether it is due to 
market inefficiency or the failure of the asset-pricing model. Similarly, if the stock price 
performance can be explained by the model, it may be because the investor sentiment is correlated 
with measures like the BM ratio. The joint-hypothesis problem, combined with the fact that actual 
returns are weakly correlated with expected returns, has led many to question the importance of 
these anomalies. Nevertheless, Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that the lack of robustness of the 
anomalies to alternative methodologies is not evidence in favor of market efficiency; the 
predictable differences in abnormal return estimates across different approaches are because some 
methodologies have more power than others. Given the complexity of measuring long-run 
performance, we can expect that there will be more work on this topic. Researchers also look for 
other evidences to test the market efficiency hypothesis. Studies on the stock price response to 
earnings announcement provide additional evidence. The next section discusses the test of market 
efficiency hypothesis with evidence from the stock price reaction to earnings announcement and 
studies on the determinants of stock price reaction to earnings restatement announcement.
1 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that, on average, stocks that have high returns in the past three to twelve 
months continue to outperform stocks that have low returns in that period. This stock price continuation in the 
intermediate horizon is referred to as momentum effect.
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2.2. Tests of the Na'ive Extrapolation Hypothesis
Studies reporting that value (or contrarian) strategies outperform the market began as early as 
Graham and Dodd (1934). This literature usually defines value stocks as stocks selling at low 
prices relative to their book value, earnings, or other measures of value and glamour stocks as 
stocks selling at high prices relative to their book value, earnings, or other measures of value (e.g., 
Lakonishok et al., 1994). Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain why the return 
differential between value stocks and glamour stocks persists so long. First, Fama and French 
(1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) argue that value stocks are judged by the market to have poor earnings 
prospect and higher risks and, thus, are selling at lower prices relative to their book value (i.e., high 
BM ratio), while the opposite applies to glamour stocks. In one word, value stocks have higher 
expected returns because they are riskier than glamour stocks. Second, Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
argue that the return differential is caused by investors’ naive extrapolation of the past sales or 
earnings growth of a firm into the future: some investors tend to get overly excited about stocks 
doing very well in the past, usually glamour stocks and buy them up; they oversell stocks doing 
very bad in the past, usually value stocks. Value stocks are usually stocks that have low past 
sales/eamings growth while glamour stocks are usually stocks that have high past sales/eamings 
growth. Consequently, glamour stocks are overpriced while value stocks are underpriced. Thus, 
when stock prices finally return to the fundamentals in the long horizon, glamour stocks will have 
lower return than the value stocks. Third, Lo and MacKinly (1990) and Kothari et al. (1995) 
suggest the return differential is due to research design induced biases. Forth, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) suggest the return differential is caused by market frictions.
Lakonishok et al.’s naive extrapolation hypothesis has caught a lot of attention and seems to 
be a good alternative hypothesis to the market efficiency hypothesis. To support the naive 
extrapolation hypothesis, Lakonishok et al. (1997) form portfolios of glamour stocks and value 
stocks each year during 1971 through 1993 and study the stock returns around the earnings 
announcement days in the post-formation period. They find that earnings announcement return
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differentials account for approximately 25 to 30 percent of the annual return differentials between 
value stocks and glamour stocks in the first two to three years following portfolio formation, 
suggesting that the higher returns of value stocks come from their positive earnings surprise; the 
return differential between value stocks and glamour stocks are smaller in large stocks, consistent 
with the notion that large stocks are less subject to mispricing. Moreover, the evidence that the 
returns on glamour stocks around earnings announcements in the first and second year after 
portfolio formation are negative is inconsistent with the risk premium story since if the return 
differential is because uncertainty about a stock realized around the announcement date, the 
abnormal return should not be negative unless ex ante risk premium is negative.
There is no published study on whether and how the stock price reaction to earnings 
restatement announcement varies by the glamour/value stock characteristics but there are 
substantial studies on the determinants of market reaction to earnings restatements. For instance, 
Palmrose, et al (2004) document that the presence of fraud, the pervasiveness of the restatement, 
and the more material changes in net income are associated with more negative reactions; 
restatements attributed to the auditor and management generally exhibit more severe 
characteristics (e.g., fraud and larger materiality) and induce larger stock price decline. Owers et al. 
(2002) find that investors react the more negatively to restatements resulting from accounting 
issues (i.e., errors / irregularities / method-change) than to those caused by other issues such as 
SEC initiated, acknowledged fraud, eamings/loss arrangement et al. The reaction is greatly 
magnified when there is a contemporaneous change in the firm’s CEO. Wu (2002) documents that 
return response is more negative when the restatement involves fraud, revenue recognition, and 
SEC filed reports (i.e., 10K or 10Q, as oppose to unofficial reports).
So far, we have discussed the relevant studies for our tests of the market efficiency hypothesis 
and the naive extrapolation hypothesis with evidence from earnings restatements. Like other 
corporate events, earnings restatement announcements might also influence the value of the 
restating firm’s rivals. The next section discusses the related literature on the intra-industry effects
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of earnings restatements.
2.3. The Intra-industry Effects
A company’s activity or decision may convey information about the other companies. Firth 
(1976), one of the earliest studies on information transfer, documents that earnings announcements 
by British firms affected not only their own stock prices but also the stock prices of other firms in 
the same industry; moreover, the stock price movement of the peer firms is positively correlated 
with the earnings surprise of the announcing firm. Aharony and Swary (1983) study the effects on 
peer stocks of the three largest bank failures in US. They find that when the bank failure is caused 
by problems correlated across banks, the stock prices of other banks drop; when a bank failure is 
due to factors idiosyncratic to the bankrupt firm, such as frauds, no contagion effects are observed.
Lang and Stulz (1992) provide the first comprehensive treatment of intra-industry effect of 
bankruptcy announcements. They examine two types of intra-industry effects: the contagion effect 
and the competitive effect. They define the contagion effect as the wealth loss experienced by 
firms with cash flow characteristics similar to those of the bankrupt firms because the 
announcement conveys information about the present value of cash flow for these firms. The 
contagion effect can be triggered by two factors: first, when a firm bankrupts, customers, suppliers, 
and creditors might be wary of the whole industry regardless of their economic health and hence 
adds to the costs of the industry; second, the bankruptcy announcement reveals negative 
information about the earnings perspectives of the whole industry. On the other hand, stocks of the 
rival firms may gain from the bankruptcy announcement because the announcement conveys 
information about the present and future competitive position of the firms in the bankrupt firm’s 
industry. Lang and Stulz define the latter effect as the competitive effect. They find that, on 
average, bankruptcy announcements decrease the value of a value-weighted portfolio of 
competitors by 1%. They further indicate that the relative strength of these two effects is 
determined by the characteristics of the bankrupt firm’s industry: the higher the degree of industry
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concentration the stronger the competitive effect since competitors are more likely to benefit from 
the weakening of the bankrupt firm in highly concentrated industries (or less competitive market); 
higher leverage implies that firm value is sensitive to the total value and cash flow of the firm and, 
thus, strengthens both effects; high leverage can also restrict competitors from taking more debt to 
prey on the distressed firm and, thus, weakens competitive effect. Thus, industry leverage has 
ambiguous impact on the intra-industry effects; the more similar the cash flow characteristic of the 
investment of the bankrupt firm and the its rivals, the more vulnerable the rivals are to the 
contagion effect since investors decrease their expectation of the profitability of the investment. 
Consistent with their predictions, they find that positive competitive effect dominates in industries 
with high concentration and low leverage while negative contagion effect is more pronounced in 
highly leveraged industries and industries where the cash flow similarity between the bankrupt 
firm and its rivals is high.
Haensly et al. (1999) argue that the empirical results of Lang and Stulz (1992) may be driven 
by measurement biases. They examine a larger sample in a period without shift of legal regime but 
do not detect either the contagion effect or the competitive effect. They suggest two possible 
explanations for failing to detect significant intra-industry effects: first, the industry portfolios are 
sufficiently diversified to mask effects of differences in industry concentration and leverage; 
second, industry concentration and leverage are secondary to other factors, such as business risk. If 
the first explanation is true, research on more homogeneous industry subgroups or individual 
industry rivals might detect intra-industry effects.
In fact, studies on single industry have documented significant intra-industry effects. For 
instance, Cheng and McDonald (1996) hypothesize that the market structure of an industry plays 
an important role in determining the intra-industry effects of bankruptcy announcements. They 
document that the overall bankruptcy announcement effect is significantly positive in the airline 
industry but significantly negative in the railroad industry. Impson (2000) examines the 
intra-industry effect of dividend reduction and omission in the electric utility industry. The results
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suggest that, on average, the stock prices of the competitors decline; furthermore, high leveraged 
utilities experience the most negative reactions; utilities with large size, high BM ratio or high 
Altman’s Z-score (a proxy for the firms’ quality) suffer less from the negative contagion effect.
The information transfer of a corporate event might not be restricted within the industry. 
Brewer and Jackson (2002) argue that firms which produce similar output and use similar input 
may also be influenced even though they are in different industries. Their study documents 
negative inter-industry contagion effect of financial distress of commercial banks and life 
insurance companies; the effect can be explained by geographic proximity, asset composition, 
liability composition, leverage, size, and regulatory expectations.
In addition to the above studies, the literature has also examined the information transfer of 
other corporate events, such as dividend initiations (Howe and Shen, 1998), dividend changes 
(Firth, 1996; Bessler and Nohel, 2000), share repurchase (Erwin and Miller, 1998; Otchere and 
Ross, 2002), merger proposals (Eckbo, 1983), going private events (Slovin et al., 1991) and bond 
rating downgrades (Akhigbe et al., 1997).
Studies on the information content of earnings restatement announcements have found some 
bases to study their information transfer. It is well documented that earnings restatements lead to 
significant stock price decline of about 10 percent around the announcement day (e.g., Palmrose, et 
al (2004), Hirschey et al. (2003), GAO (2002), Wu (2002) et al.). GAO’s report (2002) documents 
that during January1997 through June 2002, firms restating financial statement lost 95.6 billion 
dollars in market capitalization totally after controlling for general market movement and stock 
price fell by 9.5 percent on average in the three-event-day window. The magnitude of CAR around 
the restatement announcement is larger than that of the other corporate events. For example, the 
average CAR of earnings restatement announcement is -8.49 percent in the (-1,1) event-date 
window in our study1, compared with 3.35 percent for share repurchase announcement in the same
1 Although using the restatement data collected by GAO (2002), this study uses the stock returns data from the CRSP 
while GAO (2002) uses the returns data from the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. Moreover, GAO (2002)
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window (Erwin, 1998), -2.79 percent for dividend increase announcement, and -4.7 percent in 
dividend decrease announcement in the (-1,4) window (Firth, 1996). The magnitude of the average 
CAR is only smaller than the -19.53 percent for bankruptcy announcement (Lang and Stulz, 1992). 
Thus, like other corporate events, earnings restatement conveys significant information about the 
even firms’ value.
Hribar and Jenkins (2003) indicate that the loss of market value upon earnings restatement 
announcements is due to a number of factors, such as revisions of future earnings and cash flows 
due to the non-existence of past earnings, revisions in expected growth rates, uncertainty regarding 
managerial competence and integrity, and fears of additional accounting irregularities. Thus, 
earnings restatement changes investors’ valuation of the restating firm in two ways: first, earnings 
restatement revises the firm’s past earnings. Since investors use a firm’s past earnings data to infer 
its earnings prospect, a reduction in the firm’s past earnings could lead to a downward revision of 
the expectation of the firm’s earnings prospect. This notion is consistent with the findings of 
Palmrose et al. (2004) and Anderson and Yohn (2002) that earnings restatements involving 
revenues recognition issues and reductions in core earnings tend to have more negative stock-price 
response; second, earnings restatement might lead to events, such as lawsuit, management shuffle, 
and restructuring, that add to the costs and uncertainty of the company. As uncertainty increases, 
investors require higher expected returns for the company’s stock. Consequently, the stock price 
falls upon earnings restatement. For instance, Feroz et al. (1991) document a higher probability of 
management changes following restatement. Jones and Weingram (1997) find that firms that 
restate prior financial statements are substantially more likely to be sued by other firms. Palmrose 
and Scholz (2003) report that 37.6 percent of the restating firms in their sample are involved in 
litigation. Palmrose et al. (2004) document increases in the relative bid-ask spreads around the 
announcement window, suggesting that increased monitoring costs are associated with the 
negative market reactions. Hribar and Jenkins (2003) show that earnings restatement increases the
calculates the market-adjusted returns rather than the CARs.
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firm’s cost of equity capital and the perceived risk of the firm.
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3. Hypotheses
Earnings restatements change the restating firms’ past earnings figures and causes investors to 
reinvestigate the firm value, potentially leading to more accurate valuation of the restating firms 
after the earnings restatement announcements. Nevertheless, using exclusively the CAR approach, 
prior studies find that market underreacts to earnings restatement. This study refines the earnings 
restatement sample and use improved approaches to discriminate between the market efficiency 
hypothesis and the underreaction hypothesis. The null hypothesis is established below:
Hypothesis 1. Investors correctly reevaluate the firm  after it restates financial statement. Thus, 
restating firms on average do not have abnormal returns in the post-announcement period, ceteris 
paribus.
The naive extrapolation hypothesis suggests investors overestimate (underestimate) the future 
earnings/sales growth of glamour (value) stocks because glamour (value) stocks have superior 
(low) past growth of sales/eamings. In other words, the worse the past performance the more likely 
the stocks will be underpriced while the better the past performance the more likely the stocks will 
be overpriced. Lakonishok et al. (1997) show stocks with low (high) BM ratios usually have high 
(low) past sales/eamings growth. Therefore, in testing the naive extrapolation hypothesis, we use 
BM ratio, CP ratio, and past sales/eamings growth as alternative measures to identify glamour 
stocks and value stocks.
To test the hypothesis, we assume that prior to earnings restatement announcements, value 
(glamour) stocks were underpriced (overpriced) relative to their original financial figures while 
stocks that have average past sales/eamings performance were fairly valued relative to their 
original financial figures. When a company restates its past earnings figures, investors will 
reinvestigate the company’s earnings prospects since they find their previous projections were 
based on the false original financial statement. If investors keep their naive extrapolation behavior,
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the value stocks that announce earnings restatements will be further underpriced as investors find 
the companies’ actual past earnings growth is lower than they previously states. Moreover, 
investors might consider these stocks as extremely risky and dump these stocks. Therefore, other 
things equal, the prices of value stocks will drop more than the prices of stocks with average past 
sales/eamings growth. Glamour stocks that announce earnings restatements might fall out of the 
glamour stock category as investors find the superior earnings growth is due to aggressive 
accounting practice. As a result, these stocks will become less overpriced or even underpriced 
when they announce earnings restatements. Thus, other things equal, the price of the glamour 
stocks will drop more than the prices of stocks with average past sales/eamings growth as the 
former were overpriced relative to their original financial figures. Thus, the first prediction of the 
naive extrapolation hypothesis is:
Prediction A: Investors naively extrapolate past performance and they continue to do so after 
earnings restatement announcement. As a result, value stocks and glamour stocks will experience 
more negative abnormal returns than stocks with average past performance upon earnings 
restatement announcement, ceteris paribus.
It is also possible that, after earnings restatements, investors reinvestigate the restating firm 
and drop the naive extrapolation behavior. As a result, the prices of value stocks and glamour 
stocks will return to the intrinsic value. When stock prices return to the intrinsic value, the prices of 
stocks that were overpriced drop more than the prices of stocks that were less overpriced. Thus, the 
second prediction of the naive extrapolation hypothesis is:
Prediction B. Investors naively extrapolate past earnings growth but they drop this behavior 
after earnings restatement announcement. Thus, glamour stocks will experience the most negative 
abnormal returns while value stocks will experience the least negative abnormal returns, ceteris
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paribus.
The predictions of the naive extrapolation hypothesis can be illustrated in Figure 2. The x-axis 
represents the glamour/value stock characteristic; the y-axis the cumulative abnormal return of the 
stocks of restating firms around the earnings restatement announcements. The reversed U shape 
curve represents Prediction A while the upward line represents Prediction B.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Although an implication from the information transfer literature is that earnings restatement 
announcements do not have contagion effect, it has not been tested empirically. There are two 
reasons to suspect that the contagion effect exists: first, earnings restatements lower investors’ 
expectation of the profitability of the firm’s investment. Firms that have similar investment as that 
of the restating firm, usually the rivals, might suffer because of the change in investors’ valuation 
of the investment. This effect could be more significant if the restating firm is a leader in the 
industry and investors perceive the profitability of the industry based on the major players’ 
performance; second, if earnings restatement reveals that the improper accounting practice widely 
exists in the industry, it might cause the market participants to reassess the financial reports and the 
creditworthiness of the industry. As industries develop, new problems emerge over time. A single 
earnings restatement might start a series of discoveries of problems in the restating firm’s industry. 
If so, investors could require higher expected return to compensate for the increased risks of 
discovering more accounting irregularities in the restating firm’s industry. Consequently, the stock 
prices of the rival firms drop.
On the other side, earnings restatements might have competitive effect for two reasons: first, 
earnings restatement reveals information about the relative competitive positions of the companies 
in the industry. Stocks of rival firms might gain when investors find the relative competitive 
positions of the rival firms are stronger than it appealed to be before earnings restatement; second, 
the additional costs borne by the restating firm subsequent to the earnings restatement
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announcement would bring its competitors profit opportunities. The null hypothesis on the 
intra-industry effects of earnings restatement can be established as:
Hypothesis 2. Earnings restatement does not convey industry-wide information and, thus, 
does not influences the stock prices o f the restating firm ’s competitors.
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4. Data and Methodologies
4.1. Sample Description
A list of earnings restatements due to accounting irregularities announced during January 
1997 through June 2002 is obtained from GAO. According to GAO’s (2002) report, it is the most 
comprehensive sample during that period and contains 919 earnings restatements announced by 
845 public companies. The accounting and stock returns data are drawn from COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP, respectively. The sample period almost covers the stock market runup during the late 1990s 
and its collapse after March 2000. It is the period when the number and magnitude of earnings 
restatement surge to historic high, providing us a large number of observations. In this period, the 
public concern on corporate governance grew, leading to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
July 2002. There is no shift in legal regime during the sample period. We exclude earnings 
restatements announced by American Depository Receipts (ADRs) firms because they subject to 
different supervisory requirements.
Table 1 compares the characteristics of the restating firms and all the COMPUSTAT firms at 
the end of the quarter prior to earnings restatement. While both the median and mean values are 
presented, we mainly rely on nonparametric test because it avoids the problems caused by 
skewness and outliners. Since earnings restatements are unevenly distributed across industries 
(Beasley et al., 2000) and the average size, BM ratio, and leverage vary from industry to industry, 
it might be more meaningful to use the industry-adjusted indicators. An industry-adjusted variable 
is calculated by subtracting from the raw variable of the restating firm at the end of the quarter 
prior to the restatement the industry median at the same point of time. We identify companies in 
the same industry by matching their 4-digit historical SIC codes in the fiscal year when earnings 
restatement was announced. The reason to use the historical SIC code rather than the current SIC 
code is that some firms might change their industry after the sample period, making current SIC 
code an imprecise proxy for industry sector in the sample period. The earlier the event day the 
more severe the problem is. COMPUSTAT does not support screening firms with certain historical
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SIC code in specific year. Thus, we draw all the historical SIC code data from COMPUSTAT and 
write SAS program to identify industry peers by year.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 1 shows that restating firms are not significantly different from the non-restating firms 
in the raw BM ratio in any year. The industry adjusted-BM ratio of the restating firm, however, is 
significantly different from zero for three years and for the whole sample period. This discrepancy 
suggests that restating firms concentrate in industries with more growth opportunities (reflected in 
the low BM ratio) but they have less growth opportunities or are considered riskier than their 
peers.
Restating firms are larger in size: the median market value of the restating firms is smaller 
than the median of all the COMPUSTAT firms only in the year 1997. Our result is different from 
the previous results which suggest that restating firms concentrate in small firms (e.g., Beasley et 
al., 2000). This discrepancy might be caused by a significant increase in the number of large 
restating firms during the sample period. The differences in median are significant and grow larger 
in the latter four years. The industry-adjusted market value of the restating firms suggests the 
similar trend.
Restating firms also have a higher leverage in terms of the ratio of total debt to total assets but 
the difference is significant in only one year and for the aggregate level. Nevertheless, the 
industry-adjusted leverage is significant in sample years. These results suggest that restating firms 
concentrate in low leveraged industries but they have higher leverage than their peers. This result 
is consistent with that of Richardson et al. (2002) suggesting that one of the motivations that 
restating firms manipulate their earnings is to attract external financing at a lower cost.
Some companies restated the same financial statement more than once, making the second 
announcement less informative. To reduce this noise, only the first announcement in the sample is 
kept if a company announces restatement more than once within the same fiscal year. However, if 
the second or third announcement is not made in the same fiscal year, they are kept. To isolate the
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effect of earnings restatement from other factors, companies that announce earnings figure or 
guidance, or bankruptcy over the (-5, 5) event-date window are excluded. The information on 
earnings or earnings guidance announcement and bankruptcy announcement is collected by 
searching the U.S. news in the Factiva database around the event day of each firm. Stocks selling 
below one dollar before earnings restatement are excluded because they have wide bid-ask spreads, 
high commissions, low liquidity (Conrad and Kaul, 1993) and higher delisting risks. After these 
procedures, the sample includes 542 earnings restatements but the number of observations varies 
in different tests depending on data availability.
Table 2 shows that sample firms have average CAR of -7.40 percent and -9.05 percent over 
the (-1,1) and (-5,5) windows, respectively. Both CARs are statistically significant. The median 
CARs are smaller, with 3.62 percent and 4.10 percent over the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, 
respectively. Corhay and Rad (1996) show that since stock returns series generally exhibit 
time-varying volatility, a market model accounting for generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedastic (GARCH) effects leads to more efficient estimators of abnormal return than a 
market model estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Thus, we also estimate the 
abnormal returns using market model with the GARCH (1,1) procedure (please see Appendix 1 for 
the details of the GARCH (1,1) model). Table 3 suggests that the GARCH-adjusted technique only 
have small impact on the results since the GARCH-adjusted CARs are similar to the conventional 
CAR. The GARCH-adjusted average CARs are -7.42 percent and -8.92 percent in the (-1,1) and 
(-5,5) windows, respectively. The results in Table 2 and Table 3 suggest that the (-5,5) window 
seems to capture most of the impact of earnings restatement on stock prices since none of the 
abnormal returns outside the window pass both the standardized cross-sectional (SCS) test and the 
generalized sign tests.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
[Insert Table 3 about here]
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4.2. Methodology
4.2.1. Long-run Post-event Stock Price performance
This study uses three approaches to measure the stock price performance of restating firms in 
the one year and six months following earnings restatement. They are the CAR approach, the 
BHAR approach, and the calendar-time approach. We define the one-year post-announcement 
period as from the 2nd day through 255th day following the announcement date; the six-month 
post-announcement period is the (2, 128) event day window. We assume that each month has 21 
trading days except in the sixth and twelfth month which are assumed to have 22 trading days to 
fill the six-month and twelve-month event-day window.
As a comparison with the prior studies, the conventional CAR approach is used first. A 
precision-weighted CAR advocated by Cowan (2002) is also used to control for the variance of 
stock returns. The abnormal return is the predicted error of the market model1. The estimation 
period is from 300 days to 66 days before the restatement. The SCS test introduced by Boehmer et 
al. (1991) and the generalized sign test advocated by Cowan (1992) are performed to test the null 
hypothesis of zero CAR. The construction of the test statistics is presented in Appendix 2.
The measure of abnormal performance in the BHAR approach is the average BHAR. First, for 
each restating firm, the monthly return is calculated by compounding the daily returns in that 
month; then these monthly returns are compounded to calculate the six-month or one-year 
buy-and-hold returns (BHRs). By compounding the monthly returns rather than directly 
compounding all the daily returns in the holding period, we alleviate the bad model problem. Each 
restating firm’s BHAR is the difference between its BHR and the equal weighted CRSP market 
index within the holding period. The cross-sectional test is performed to test the significance of the 
six-month or one-year BHAR. To alleviate the misspecification problem in using daily returns, the 
average abnormal return of each month and the holding period is tested using the bootstrapped
1 In this study, the CRSP equal-weighted market index is used in the market model to estimate the abnormal returns of 
individual firm and an equal-weighted stock portfolio; while CRSP value-weighted market index is used to estimate the 
abnormal returns of a value-weighted stock portfolio.
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approach associated with the skewness-adjusted t test (Please see Appendix 3 for details). If a firm 
is delisted within the holding period, it is assumed that the stock is sold at the end of the last 
trading day and the proceeds are reinvested in the rest of the stocks in the portfolio equally in the 
next trading day.
Besides the conventional BHAR, we also combine the BHAR approach with the control firm 
method. In this case, the BHAR of each restating firm is defined as:
BHARjjj = f [ 0  + f [ 0  + ^ c)
(=1 /=1
where Rjt and R;t are the returns of sample firm j and its control firm, respectively, in month t; T 
denotes the number of month and is equal to 6 or 12 depending on the length of the holding period. 
The average BHAR is defined as:
a h a r t = ~ Y jb h a r iT
n~;=i
where n is the number of firms in the buy-and-hold portfolio. The t-statistic is computed as the 
AHAR divided by the estimated standard error of AHAR.
We modify the methods used by Lyon, et al (1999) and Desai et al. (2002) to identify a size-, 
BM ratio-, and momentum- matched control firm for each sample firm. The control firms are 
required to be selling above one dollar and remain listed within the (0, 20) event date window. For 
each restating firm, we identify all the non-restating firms with market value and BM ratio 
between 70 percent and 130 percent of those of the restating firm at the end of the month when 
restatement is announced. We do not match the value at the beginning of the event month since the 
market is more likely to accept the price after the restatement as reference than the price before. 
From this set of firms, the firm that has past one-year returns closest to that of the sample firm is 
selected as the control firm.
We use the calendar-time portfolio approach advocated by Desai et al. (2002). To measure the 
performance of stocks that have earnings restatement in the past one year, at the beginning of each
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month from June 1997 through December 2002, a portfolio of firms that announced restatement 
during the past 1 year is formed. The portfolios in June 1997 and December 2002 include 14 and 
84 stocks, respectively, compared with the median (mean) of 61 (59) for the whole period. The 
portfolio return is then regressed on the Fama and French’s (1993) three factor and the momentum 
factor suggested by Carhart (1997). The model can be expressed as equation (1). To allow for 
heteroskedasticity, the regression is run with the WLS technique using the number of stocks in the 
portfolio as the weight.
PRETt = a  + AMRET, + &SMBt + /?3HMLt + /?4MOMTt + et (1) 
where PRETt is the monthly portfolio return for restating firms in excess of the one-month 
risk-free rate (proxied by one-month Treasury bill rate); MRETt is the excess return on a broad 
market portfolio; SMBt is the return differential between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio 
of large stocks; HMLt is the return differential between a portfolio of high BM ratio stocks and a 
portfolio of low BM ratio stocks; MOMTt is the return differential between a portfolio with high 
returns in the past one year and a portfolio of stocks with low returns in the past one year. The 
breakpoint for size portfolios is the median of NYSE market equity. The breakpoints for BM ratio 
and momentum portfolios are the 30th and 70th percentiles of NYSE stocks.
To measure the abnormal return in the six months following earnings restatement, the 
portfolio is formed in a slightly different way. That is, at the beginning of each month firms that 
announced earnings restatement during the past six months are selected to form the portfolio. To 
reduce the problem caused by small number of stocks in the portfolios at the beginning and the end 
of the sample period, the portfolio is formed from April 1997 through August 2002.
Since the calendar-time portfolio approach equally weighs each month, if the stock price 
performance in periods of high activity is different from that in periods of low activity, the 
regression method will average out the differences, making the approach less likely to detect 
abnormal performance (Loughran and Ritter, 2000). We perform two types of robust checks. First, 
the post-announcement performance in a period when the market is going up might be different
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
from that in a period of market collapse. We rerun the regressions in two subsample periods 
divided at March 2000, an inflection point where the S&P 500 index turns from gaining to losing. 
The second robust check is on whether the performance varies in heavy- and low- earnings 
restatement periods. The reason for suspecting the performance differential is that high frequency 
of earnings restatement might be driven by problems widely exists in the industry, causing the 
stock prices to drop more in the period following heavy restatement announcements. Two dummy 
variables, LOW and HIG, are used to reflect the frequency of earnings restatement during the 
period prior to the earnings restatement. The frequency of earnings restatement is calculated by 
dividing the number of firms in the calendar-time portfolio each month by the total number of 
firms having return data in the CRSP in that month. HIG is equal to 1 if the frequency in that 
month lies above the 70th percentile in all the months and zero otherwise; while LOW is equal to 1 
if the frequency is below 30th percentile of all monthly activities and zero otherwise. Since the 
small number of stocks included in the portfolio at the beginning and the end of the sample period 
is driven mainly by the short period of restatement records, we set LOW to be equal to 0 for the 
1-year holding portfolios in the June 1997 -  December 1997 and August 2002 -  December 2002 
periods. For the 6-month holding portfolios, LOW is equal to 0 in the April 1997 -  June 1997 and 
August 2002 -  September 2002 periods.
4.2.2. Tests of the Na'ive Extrapolation Hypothesis
Previous studies identify glamour stocks and value stocks by sorting the stock universe by the 
raw BM ratio: stocks with high raw BM ratio are value stocks while stocks with low raw BM ratio 
are glamour stocks. Since the average BM ratio varies by industries, we contend that the 
industry-adjusted BM ratio is a better proxy than the raw BM ratio since the average BM ratio 
varies in different industries. A restating firm’s industry-adjusted BM ration is calculated by 
subtracting from the raw BM ratio the industry median at the end of the quarter prior to its earnings 
restatement announcement. We identify value (glamour) stocks as stocks that have high (low)
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industry-adjusted BM ratio. We use the CAR in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) event day windows to 
measure the stock price response to earnings restatement. We test the na'ive extrapolation 
hypothesis by examining the relationship between the industry adjusted-BM ratio1 and the CAR.
In the univariate test, we sort the restating firms into five deciles by their adjusted BM ratio 
with decile 1 containing stocks ranking highest on adjusted BM ratio. The average CAR of each 
decile is calculated to compare the stock price response. If Prediction A is true, then the average 
CAR of decile 1 and decile 5 should be more negative than the average CAR of decile 3. If 
Prediction B is true, then the average CAR of decile 1 should be less negative than that of decile 3 
which is less negative than that of decile 5.
One problem in comparing the average CAR of deciles is that glamour stocks might have 
more negative CAR than the value stocks simply because glamour stocks restate larger amount 
than value stocks. If so, the relationship between the CAR and the adjusted BM ratio might simply 
reflect the correlation between the restatement magnitude and the CAR. To control for the impact 
of the magnitude of restatement, we examine the correlation between the adjusted BM ratio and 
the response coefficient. The response coefficient is the coefficient of MAGit in the regression 
CARit = a + P MAGit + et (2)
where CARit denotes the cumulative abnormal return on firm i over the (-1,1) or (-5,5) window; 
MAGit, the restatement magnitude of firm i, is the cumulative net change in the firm’s net income 
due to earnings restatement scaled by the shareholders’ equity at the end of the quarter prior to the 
restatement. Because firms restate financial results in different categories and tax data is not 
available for some companies, only 202 observations have enough data to compute the restatement 
magnitude.
In the multivariate tests, we divide the sample into three deciles by the adjusted BM ratio with 
decile 1 containing stocks ranking highest on adjusted BM ratio. The regression of CAR on the
1 For convenience, we use the adjusted BM ratio hereafter to refer to the industry-adjusted BM ratio and use the raw BM 
ratio to refer to the BM ratio used in the prior studies.
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restatement magnitude and adjusted BM ratio is run on decile 1 and 3:
CARit =a+px MAGit +02 ABMit +et (3)
where CARlt and MAGit are the same as those in regression (3); ABM;, is the adjusted BM ratio of 
the restating firm. Since the CAR is negative while ABM is positive, a significantly positive /?2 
suggests that, given the restatement magnitude, the higher the adjusted BM ratio the less negative 
stock price response will be. If Prediction A is true, /?2 will be negative in decile 1 but positive in 
decile 3. If Prediction B is true, 0 2 will be positive both in decile 1 and decile 3; We do not add 
interactive term (the product of the restatement magnitude and the adjusted BM ratio) because the 
correlation between these two independent variables is insignificant. Although the inclusion of 
restatement magnitude can improve the explanatory power, it decreases the degree of freedom 
since we only have restatement magnitude data for 202 observations. We remove the restatement 
magnitude from regression (3) and run the regression. Without the restatement magnitude, the 
sample size more than double.
To make this study comparable to the extant literature, we repeat the multivariate tests but use 
the methods suggested by Lakonishok et al. (1994) to identify glamour stocks and value stocks. 
Our universe of stocks consists of all the stocks listed on the NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ, except 
for real estate investment trusts (REITs), ADRs, closed-end funds, unit investment, and trusts. At 
the end of each year, the universe stocks are independently sorted in ascending order into three 
groups -  (1) bottom 30 percent, (2) middle 40 percent, and (3) top 30 percent -  by the raw BM 
ratio and by past sales growth (GS), and then take intersections resulting from the two 
classifications. The past sales growth is the same as that in Lakonishok et al. (1994). Specifically, 
we rank all the stocks in year -1 , -2, ..., -5 prior to formation by the sales growth rate in that year 
and compute each stock’s weighted average rank, giving the weight of 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 to its growth 
rank in year -1, -2, -3, -4 -5, respectively. Restating firms in the low (high) BM high (low) GS 
group at the end of the year prior to the earnings restatement are glamour (value) stocks. We then 
substitute the raw BM ratio in regression (3) for the adjusted BM ratio and run the regression on
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the restating firms on the low BM high GS subsample and the high BM low GS subsample, 
separately. Moreover, we use the CP ratio and GS in identifying value stocks and glamour stocks. 
We then substitute the CP ratio for the adjusted BM ratio in regression (3) and run the regression 
on the glamour stock subsample and the value stock subsample.
As is indicated in Section 2, previous studies report that the market reaction to earnings 
restatement varies by the reasons of earnings restatement. If glamour stocks and value stocks 
restate financial figures for different reasons, the results might be influenced. GAO (2002) divides 
the restatement reasons into nine categories: revenue recognition, acquisitions or mergers, cost or 
expense, securities-related, related-party transactions, reclassification,
restructuring/assets/inventory, and other reasons. We use their categories and defined eight dummy 
variables of restatement reason accordingly. The measures of stocks price reaction are then 
regressed against the glamour/value stock characteristics variable and the eight dummy variables.
4.2.3. The Intra-industry Effects
To measure the stock price response of the peer firms, we form a value-weighted portfolio for 
each earnings restatement announcement and calculate the CAR of the peer portfolio around the 
announcement day. The average CAR of the peer portfolios measures the intra-industry effect on 
the aggregate level. This method accounts for the problem caused by the potentially 
cross-sectional correlation among returns in the industry. Each peer portfolio contains all the firms 
that have the same historical SIC code as that of the restating firm in the year when earnings 
restatement was made. For each portfolio, the market model is estimated using the returns from 
250 to 50 trading days before earnings restatement. Two event day windows, (-5, 5) and (-1,1), are 
used to measure each peer portfolio’s abnormal returns. We also calculate the average CAR of 
equal weighted peer portfolios as a robust check.
The contagion and competitive effects can offset each other and it is difficult to separate them 
empirically. However, they can be detected since the relative strength of the two effects might vary
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by industry characteristic. Prior studies (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1992; Erwin and Miller, 1998) 
suggest the intra-industry effect of bankruptcy announcement is determined by the cash flow 
similarity, degree of competition, and industry leverage. These industry characteristics could also 
influence the intra-industry effect of earnings restatements.
For firms that have investments whose cash flow characteristics are similar to those of the 
restating firm, earnings restatements could convey bad news about these companies because the 
value of their investments is correlated with that of the restating firm’s. Thus, the contagion effect 
is expected to be more pronounced for companies with highly similar cash flow characteristics 
than for other companies. We use the correlation between the return of the industry portfolio and 
the stock return of the restating firm for the year preceding the earnings restatement announcement 
to proxy for the degree of cash flow similarity. The information transfer hypothesis predicts that 
the contagion effect will be more pronounced in industries where the restating firm and its rivals 
has high cash flow similarity than in industries where the cash flow similarity is low.
As is discuss before, earnings restatements might add to the costs of the restating firms. As a 
result, demand might shift from the restating firm to its competitors. In a perfectly competitive 
market, competitors cannot benefit from this shift in demand since all firms have zero economic 
profits. In a less competitive market, however, rivals can benefit by extracting greater economic 
rents since their products would be substitutes for the now more expensive products of the 
restating firm. Thus, competitive effect is expected to be more pronounced in industries with a 
lower degree of competition among the event firm’s rivals. The Herfindahl index is used to proxy 
for the degree of competition. We calculate the Herfindahl index as the sum of the squared market 
shares of the rival firms at the end of the year preceding the announcement of earnings restatement. 
The higher the Herfindahl index, the less competitive (or higher concentrated) the market is. Thus, 
we expect that industry portfolios with Herfindahl indices above the sample median experience 
more positive abnormal returns than those with Herfindahl indices below the sample median.
Industry leverage can also influence the intra-industry effects. The greater the leverage the
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more sensitive the equity value is to the firm value. Thus, the contagion effect is expected to be 
stronger in industries with high leverage than in industries with low leverage. The relation between 
leverage and the competitive effect is mixed: on the one hand, financial leverage magnifies the 
competitive effect since the higher the leverage the more sensitive the equity value to changes in 
firm value; on the other hand, it limits the rivals’ ability to respond to the opportunity by taking 
more debt. We use the industry median total debt to total asset ratio at the end of the year preceding 
the earnings restatement announcement to proxy for the industry leverage. To test the interaction 
between leverage and intra-industry effects, we investigate the stock price reaction of industry 
portfolios with leverage below the sample median and industry portfolios with leverage above the 
sample median. Following Lang and Stulz (1992), we also investigate the relation between 
industry competition and stock price reaction within these two categories.
Moreover, the intra-industry effect might be more significant the more negative the CAR of 
the restating firm around the announcement date. An earnings restatement that has small impact on 
stock price of the restating firm might only reflect small changes in the firm value and competitive 
position and, thus, have little impact on the competitors. Since investors might consider the 
performance of industry leaders as a barometer of the industry, earnings restatement announced by 
an industry leader might have larger intra-industry effect than those by non-leader firms.
For each peer portfolio, the Herfindahl index and the ratio of total debt to total assets are 
calculated at the end of the year prior to the restatement announcement. The peer portfolios are 
stratified into four subgroups by the median of the Herfindahl index and industry leverage. The 
peer portfolios are also stratified into two subgroups by the median stock return correlation. The 
CAAR of each industry subgroup is calculated and compared to test the relationship between 
industry characteristics and the strength of the two intra-industry effects. To examine whether 
earnings restatement made by industry leaders have greater intra-industry effect, we separately 
examine 56 earnings restatements announced by S&P 500 component companies.
Besides the stratification method, we also regress the peer portfolios’ CAR on its determinants.
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Lang and Stulz’s (1992) find that the Herfindahl index is negatively and significantly correlated 
with the stock return correlation. However, in our study, the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the two variables is only -0.068 and not significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, we put 
the Herfindahl index and the stock return correlation in one regression. The CAR of restating firm 
and S&P 500 dummy variable are added to control for the strength of information transfer. To 
control for heteroskedasticity, the regression is run with the WLS technique, i.e., using the 
reciprocal of the variance of the portfolio CAR as the weight. A Monte Carlo simulation study by 
Karafiath (1994) shows that the WLS technique is well specified in the presence of 
cross-correlation of error terms. Below is the regression run with WLS technique:
PCAR =<?+/?! HER +&LEV +&COR +&RCAR +/?3SP +e (4)
where PCAR is the CAR of the peer portfolio over the (-1,1) or (-5,5) window; HER denotes the 
Herfindahl index; LEV denotes the ratio of total debt to total assets; COR denotes the stock return 
correlation between the peer portfolio and the restating firm; RCAR is the CAR of the restating 
firm over the (-1,1) or (-5,5) window; SP is the dummy variable of S&P 500 component and is 
equal to 1 if the restating firm is an S&P 500 component firm in the year when it announced the 
earnings restatement.
5. Results and Discussions
5.1. Post-restatement Stock Price performance
The conventional and precision-weighted CAARs of restating firms over the 
post-announcement period and test statistics are shown in Table 4. The results suggest that 
restating firms do not have significant abnormal performance in either the six months or one year 
following earnings restatement. Of the twelve months following earnings restatement, restating 
firms have significant abnormal return only in the first month using the SCS test and in three 
months using the general sign test. This result is consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis 
but not the underreaction hypothesis. Figure 1 plots the mean, median, and precision-weighted
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CAR from the 63 days before to 252 days after earnings restatement. The result is in line with the 
findings that restating firms on average experience negative price drift before earnings restatement 
and no significant price drift in the long horizon following earnings restatement.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Panel A in Table 5 shows the BHARs of restating firms calculated by compounding monthly 
returns data. The result suggests that restating firms have significant negative abnormal returns of 
9.97 percent and 16.93 percent in the six-month and one-year post-announcement period, 
respectively. Panel B in Table 5 shows the BHARs calculated by compounding daily returns with 
bootstrapped approach. The skewness-adjusted t test suggests that restating firms do not 
significantly underperform the market in any month following restatement announcement except 
the first month. Restating firms underperform the market by a significant 3.16 percent in that 
month on average. The generalized sign test suggests that restating firms significantly 
underperform the market only in two months. The six-month and one-year BHARs in Panel B are 
much more negative than those in Panel A. This result is consistent with the notion that 
misspecification problem is more severe when compounding daily returns. Interestingly, the 
bootstrapped approach does not influence the results since the results are the same as that from the 
conventional method. We only report the results from the bootstrapped approach.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Table 6 compares the BHRs of the sample firms with those of the control firms. The 
cross-sectional test shows that the BHR of restating firms is not significant in any holding period. 
The insignificance might be because firms announce earnings restatement in different periods and 
the variation in market condition can lead to large variance in stock returns. The results also show 
that none of the BHAR in any holding period is significant. Thus, restating firms do not 
significantly underperform their size-, BM ratio-, and momentum- matched control firms in either 
the six-month or one-year holding period. Putting together, the results from Table 5 and Table 6
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suggest that although restating firms underperform the market, the underperformance might be due 
to their other firm characteristics, such as the size, BM ratio, and momentum, rather than earnings 
restatement.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The results of time calendar portfolio approach are shown in Table 7. Panel A and Panel B 
measure the stock price performance of restating firms in the one year and six months, respectively, 
following earnings restatement. None of the intercept terms in Panel A or Panel B is significant, 
suggesting that restating firms do not have abnormal return after controlling for size, BM ratio, and 
the momentum. Moreover, the two dummy variables, HIG and LOW, are not significant in any 
regression, suggesting that the frequency of earnings restatement does not have material impact on 
the post-announcement stock price performance of restating firms and the failure to detect 
abnormal return is not due to averaging over months of “hot” and “cold” event activity. Panel C 
and Panel D in Table 7 perform the regression tests on two periods: before April 1, 2000 and after 
April 1, 2000. The results show no material difference in the stock price performance between the 
two periods and the intercept terms remain insignificant, suggesting that the previous regression 
results are not influenced by variation in the market conditions.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
The adjusted R2 of the eight regressions in Table 7 varies from 0.67 to 0.83, suggesting that 
the four return generating factors, especially the market excess return, the size, and momentum 
factors, explain a large portion of the variance of the stock returns of the restating firms. Market 
excess return is a significant explanatory variable in all the regressions. The market /3 is smaller 
than one in five of the eight regressions, suggesting that stock price of the restating firms is no 
more volatile than the market. The size factor is significantly and positively correlated with the 
excess returns of the restating firms in all the regressions, suggesting that restating firms perform 
well when small stocks perform well. This might not contradict the fact that the average restating 
firms have market value larger than the average firms in the stock market both before and after the
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restatement announcement1 because the size factor may also proxy for other risk characteristics 
besides size itself. However, since it is unclear what risk characteristics does size exactly proxy for 
(Fama and French, 1996), it is hard to tell what common risk characteristics do restating firms and 
small firms share. The coefficient of the BM ratio factor is significant in only 2 of the 8 regressions. 
This result is in line with the finding that restating firms do not significantly differ from the other 
firms in BM ratio. The coefficient of the momentum factor is negative in all the regressions and is 
significant in 6 of the regressions. This result is consistent with the fact that restating firms 
experience negative price drift before earnings restatement and suggests that part of the 
underperformance following earnings restatement is due to momentum.
Although the conventional BHAR approach detects significant abnormal performance, no 
abnormal return is detected when combining the BHAR approach with the control firm method or 
when using the CAR approach and the calendar time portfolio approach. Thus, the results support 
hypothesis 1 that investors correctly evaluate the restating firm on average. Although we cannot 
completely reject the underreaction hypothesis, the bottom line is that the underreaction story is 
not robust in our study. Our results, however, are not comparable to the previous ones since we use 
a different sample period and methodologies. The sample period in this study is the most recent 
and is the period when accounting scandals are frequently uncovered and market’s concerns over 
accounting practices reach the peak. Thus, underreaction to earnings restatement might be reduced 
in this period. Furthermore, measures of long-run stock price performance face much criticism 
because of the joint-hypothesis problem and the misspecification problem. Evidence on the 
announcement day stock price responses presented in the next subsection avoids these problems 
and provides more evidence on the market efficient hypothesis.
1 The median (mean) market value of the sample firms is 166.9 (1997.6) million dollars 20 trading days before earnings 
restatement and is 123.7 (1921.6) million dollars 20 trading days after announcement, compared to the median (mean) 
market value of 86.57 (1484.35) for all the NYSE, NASDAQ, and ASE firms during the sample period.
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5.2. Tests of the Na'ive Extrapolation Hypothesis
In the univariate test, we divide finns into 5 deciles by the industry-adjusted BM ratio. To ensure 
that stocks in adjusted BM ratio decile 1 (5) are the value (glamour) stocks, we check the 
distribution of the restating firms’ adjusted BM ratio. Table 8 shows that the median adjusted BM 
ratio of decile 3 is zero, suggesting that decile 1 includes stocks with adjusted BM ratio larger than 
0 while decile 5 includes stocks with adjusted BM ratio small than 0. Figure 3 plots the distribution 
of the adjusted BM ratio of restating firms. The distribution of adjusted BM ratio is about evenly 
distributed in high adjusted BM ratio decile and low adjusted BM ratio decile. Thus, dividing the 
sample into five or three deciles can effectively identify glamour stocks and value stocks.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Table 8 presents the restatement magnitude and four measures of CAR of the five adjusted 
BM ratio deciles. The rank-sum test is performed to test the difference between the first, third, and 
fifth deciles. Firms in the third adjusted BM ratio decile have the largest median and average 
restatement magnitude. However, the z-statistics suggest that there is no significant difference in 
adjusted BM ratio between decile 1 and 3, decile 1 and 3, decile 3 and 5. Thus, glamour stocks 
(stocks in decile 5) do not appear to restate their financial figures in a larger magnitude than value 
stocks (stocks in decile 1) do. This result provides some guarantee that the differences in CAARs 
between the deciles are not due to differences in restatement magnitude.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The CARs shown in Table 8 are skewed. For example, the median 3-day CAR of decile 1, 3, 
and, 5 are -4.53 percent, -4.86 percent, and -3.30 percent, respectively, while their means are -7.76 
percent, -9.91 percent, and -7.7 percent, respectively, much more negative than their median. Thus, 
we use the nonparametric rank-sum test to test the difference between these deciles. The test 
results suggest that there is no significant difference in the 3-day CARs, conventional or 
GARCH-adjusted, between decile 1, decile 3, and decile 5.
The results of Table 8 are plotted in Figure 4. The graph shows that the conventional and
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GARCH-adjusted 3-day CARs have a nearly reversed “W” shape. This result is inconsistent with 
either predictions of the naive extrapolation hypothesis since it suggests no significant correlation 
between the adjusted BM ratio and stock price response. The major difference between the pattern 
of the 11-day CARs and that of the 3-day CARs is that the 11-day CARs are less negative than the 
3-day CARs in decile 1, causing the 11 -day CARs to increase monotonically with the adjusted BM 
ratio except for decile 4 and 5. A potential explanation for the discrepancy is that investors react to 
earnings restatement made by value stocks the same way as they do to other stocks and it takes 
investors a little long time, perhaps an extra couple of days, to correct their judgment error. The 
results in both Table 8 and Figure 4 are inconsistent with the two predictions of the naive 
extrapolation hypothesis.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Table 9 shows the regressions to estimate response coefficients for the five adjusted BM ratio 
deciles. Surprisingly, only one of the twenty response coefficients is significant. Moreover, the low 
adjusted R square of the regressions suggests that the net change in net income appears to explain 
only very small portion of the CAR. For example, the highest adjusted R-square is only 0.10 while 
most of the others range from 0.05 to -0.03. A potential reason might be that the net change in 
earnings is only a small factor when investors evaluate the impact of earnings restatement on the 
firm value1. Other factors, such as the reason of restatement, the involvement of frauds, 
management shuffles, class action lawsuits, might be more important in investors’ consideration of 
the value of restating firm. Since the response coefficients are insignificant in most regressions, we 
do not test the pattern of the response coefficients.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Table 10 regresses the CAR on the restatement magnitude and adjusted BM ratio. The 
regression result on the whole sample shown in Panel A suggests that the adjusted BM ratio is not
1 This is reasonable given the fact that there is large variation in stocks’ price-to-eamings (P/E) ratio which suggests that 
investors consider many other factors besides earnings figure when valuating a firm.
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significantly correlated with any of the four measures of abnormal returns. This result is 
inconsistent with pattern 1 that adjusted BM ratio is positively correlated with CAR. Panel B runs 
the regression on two subsamples -  high adjusted BM ratio subsample and low adjusted BM ratio 
subsample. The results show no significant correlation between CAR and adjusted BM ratio in 
either subsample.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Table 11 regresses CAR on the adjusted BM ratio. ABM is not significant in any 
regressions on the whole sample and is significant only in two regressions on the low adjusted BM 
ratio subsample. Moreover, in these two regressions, ABM is negatively correlated with CAR, 
opposite to the predictions of mispricing hypothesis. Again, the coefficient of the adjusted BM 
ratio is insignificant in the high adjusted BM ratio subsample. The results from Table 8 to Table 11 
suggest while using adjusted BM ratio as measures of the glamour/value stock characteristics there 
is no significant correlation between the stock price reaction and the glamour/value stock 
characteristics.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
Tablel2 regresses CAR on the restatement magnitude and the raw BM ratio. The results of the 
regression on the whole sample, shown in Panel A, show no correlation between the raw BM ratio 
and the abnormal returns. Panel B runs the regression on the low raw BM subsample (glamour 
stocks) and high raw BM subsample (value stocks), separately. There is weak evidence that 
glamour stocks are overvalued before earnings restatement since the raw BM ratio is significantly 
and positively correlated with the 11-day CARs but not the 3-day CARs in the low raw BM 
subsample. Value stocks do not appear to be underpriced since there is no significant correlation 
between the raw BM ratio and the abnormal returns in the value stock subsample. Panel C presents 
the results of regression on the glamour stock subsample (low raw BM ratio and high GS) and 
value stock subsample (high raw BM ratio and low GS). The results, however, do not support the 
two predictions of the naive extrapolation hypothesis since the coefficient of the raw BM ratio is
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insignificant in all the regressions. It should be noted that the insignificance might be due to the 
small number of observations fall in both subgroups. Table 13 regresses CAR on the raw BM ratio. 
The results are similar to those in Table 12 but the raw BM ratio is more significantly correlated 
with the abnormal return in the low raw BM ratio group. Again, the correlation is insignificant in 
either the low BM high GS subsample or the high BM low GS subsample.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
[Insert Table 13 about here]
In Table 14, the abnormal returns are regressed on CR The coefficient of CP is significant 
only in two regressions in the low CP high GS subsample but not in others, suggesting that the 
abnormal return is not significantly correlated with the glamour/value stock characteristic.
[Insert Table 14 about here]
In Table 15, we regress the four measures of stock price response on the glamour/value stock 
characteristics variables and the eight dummy variables of restatement reasons. R1 is equal to 1 if 
the restatement is due to revenue recognition and zero otherwise; R2 is equal to 1 if the restatement 
is made to correct errors involving acquisition or merger and zero otherwise; R3 is equal to 1 if 
restatement is made to correct errors in cost or expense and zero otherwise; R4 is equal to 1 if 
restatement is securities-related and zero otherwise; R5 is equal to 1 if restatement involves 
related-party transactions and zero otherwise; R6  is equal to 1 if the restatement involves 
in-process research and development and zero otherwise; R7 is equal to 1 if the restatement 
involves reclassification of accounting items and zero otherwise; R8 is equal to 1 if the restatement 
involves restructuring, assets, or inventory and zero otherwise. The results show that the 
restatement reason dummies are not significant in most of the regressions and the adjusted 
R-square is very low when performing the tests on the whole sample, the glamour stock subsample, 
and the value stock subsample. Moreover, the addition of these dummies does not change the 
relation between the stock price response and the glamour/value stock characteristics. Since the 
dummies are not significant in most regressions, we only report the results of the regressions of the
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CARs on the adjusted-BM ratio and the eight restatement dummies in Table 15. As a robust check, 
we exclude 11 observations with positive restatement magnitude from the sample and repeat the 
above tests. The results are very similar. Overall, these results are not consistent with either 
prediction of the naive extrapolation hypothesis.
[Insert Table 15 about here]
This study only investigates one type of stock price response to earnings restatement -  the 
correlation between stock price response and the glamour/value stock characteristics. Further 
studies can examine whether stock price reaction to earnings response varies under different 
market conditions or by the frequency of earnings restatement. The new evidence could suggest 
whether fluctuation in the market conditions causes expectation errors. The time regime-shifting 
models, such as those of David (1997) and Conrad et al. (2002), could be a good starting point for 
the future studies.
5.3. The Intra-industry Effects
Table 16 shows the CAAR of the 507 peer portfolios during the event date window. The CAARs of 
either value-weighted or equal-weighted peer portfolios are insignificant in the (-1 ,0 ), (0 ,1), (-1 ,1), 
or (-5,5) window. Moreover, both the value-weighted and equal-weighted peer portfolios have 
significant average abnormal return in only one of the eleven trading days. Thus, we do not detect 
significant intra-industry effect on the aggregate level. There are two possibilities for this result: 
first, the intra-industry effect is positive in some industries but negative in others. The average 
CARs of these industry portfolios averages over the positive CARs and negative CARs; second, 
the intra-industry effects only exist in a few earnings restatements.
[Insert Table 16 about here]
To explore these two possibilities, we investigate the average CAR of each industry. Table 17 
reports the abnormal returns for the value-weighted peer portfolios in the (-5,5) window. For 
industries that have more than one earnings restatement during the period, we report the average
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CAR of the peer portfolios in the industry1. We measure how frequent does an industry have 
earnings restatement by the ratio of the number of announcement to the median number of firms in 
the peer portfolio in percentage. The average frequency of announcement for each industry is 
20.59, suggesting that for every restating firm, there are about 20 non-restating firms in the peer 
portfolio. Of the ten industries that have the largest number of earnings restatement, five are 
computer-related industry (SIC code: 7372, 7370, 3576, 7373, and 3577), two in the 
pharmaceutical industry (SIC code: 2836 and 2834), and one in financial service industry (SIC 
code: 6798). Thus, the industry distribution is similar to that in Beasley, et al (2000) whose sample 
period is from 1987 through 1997. However, this result does not suggest that companies in these 
industries are more likely to restate earnings since the average frequency of restatement for these 
ten industries is only 11.7, much lower than the average of the whole sample. In Lang and Stulz’s 
(1992) study, three of the four industries with significant negative average CARs have more than 
one bankruptcy announcement in the sample, suggesting that a bankruptcy conveys more negative 
industry-wide information when the industry performs poorly. Our results on earnings restatement 
are different in that the 11 industries that have significant negative average CAR do not have high 
frequency of earnings restatement: the frequency is 15.8 compared with the average of 18.5 for the 
24 industries that have significant average CAR. Thus, unlike bankruptcy announcement, earnings 
restatement does not seem to be considered by investors as revealing industry-wide problems; 
otherwise, more significant negative CARs would be detected in industries with high frequency of 
earnings restatement.
[Insert Table 17 about here]
Table 18 presents the average CARs of different industry subgroups in the eleventh trading 
days center at the announcement date. None of the average CARs for the four industry subgroups 
stratified by the median industry concentration and leverage is significantly different from zero. 
The average CAR of the equal-weighted peer portfolio is significantly negative for the high cash
1 In this case, the abnormal return of each peer portfolio is treated as the abnormal returns of a stock.
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flow similarity subgroup, consistent with the notion that the more similar the investment of the 
non-restating competitors and the restating firm the more the competitors suffer. Nevertheless, the 
average CAR of the value-weighted peer portfolios becomes insignificant for the high cash flow 
similarity subgroup. Since small firms have larger weight in an equal-weighted portfolio than in a 
value-weighted portfolio, this difference suggests that small competitors in the peer portfolio 
suffer more than larger peers upon the announcement of earnings restatement. The reason that 
small firms suffer more is that they are usually less diversified than larger firms and, thus, are more 
sensitive to the contagion effect.
[Insert Table 18 about here]
Table 19 tests whether earnings restatement made by industry leaders has stronger 
intra-industry effect by repeating the same measures on 56 earnings restatements made by S&P 
500 companies. None of the average CAR in the industries subgroups is significant, suggesting 
that even earnings restatements made by industry leaders do not have significant intra-industry 
effect. Overall, the results in Table 18 and 18 suggest that either the intra-industry effects are rarely 
seen in earnings restatement or industry characteristics are not important determinants of 
intra-industry effect, and, thus, cannot effectively isolate positive intra-industry effect from 
negative effect.
[Insert Table 19 about here]
Table 20 regresses the CAR of peer portfolios on the determinants. The Herfindahl index is not 
significantly correlated with the CAR of the value-weighted peer portfolios but is significantly and 
negatively correlated with the CAR of the equal-weighted peer portfolios. This result is opposite to 
the notion that the higher the industry concentration the stronger the positive competitive effect. A 
possible explanation is that the fewer the companies in an industry the more likely the same type of 
accounting practice is shared by the companies; as the number of companies in the industry 
increases, improper accounting practice is more likely to be discovered in the early stage before it 
becomes popular. When this effect overrides competitive effect, industry concentration becomes
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negatively correlated with the intra-industry effect. The industry leverage is significantly and 
positively correlated with the CARs of both the value-weighted and equal-weighted peer portfolios. 
This result is opposite to that of bankruptcy announcement but not contradict to the theory which 
suggests that industry leverage has ambiguous effect on the intra-industry effects. The return 
correlation is significantly and negatively correlated with the CAR of the peer portfolio, consistent 
with the notion that the more similar the cash flow characteristics of the investment the more 
important the contagion effect. Moreover, the coefficient is more negative when using the CAR of 
equal-weighted peer portfolio than when using the CAR of value-weighted peer portfolio. This 
difference is consistent with the finding in Table 18, suggesting that small competitors suffer more 
upon the announcement than large competitors. The coefficient of the CAR of the restating firm is 
significantly positive suggesting that the more the stock of the restating firm drops the stronger 
negative impact the earnings restatement have on the peer firms. Consistent with the finding in 
Table 19, the S&P 500 dummy is insignificant suggesting that the intra-industry effect is not 
significantly stronger for industry leaders. To check the robustness of the regression results, we 
repeat the regressions in Table 20 but use CAR in the (-1,1) window as dependent variable. The 
signs and significance of the coefficients remain the same except that the coefficient of Herfindahl 
index becomes significantly and negatively correlated with the CAR of the value-weighted peer 
portfolio.
[Insert Table 20 about here]
Overall, our tests of intra-industry effect generate mixed results. We do not detect significant 
intra-industry effect on either aggregative level or industry subgroups stratified by industry 
concentration, leverage, or cash flow similarity. The regression results, however, suggest that the 
strength of the intra-industry effect varies by the industry leverage, cash flow similarity and the 
CAR of the restating firm. There are two possible explanations for the discrepancies: first, the 
stratification method fails to detect intra-industry effect because of the heterogeneity in the sample. 
Industries might be different in other characteristics which are more important in determining the
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strength of the intra-industry effects than the industry concentration and leverage do; second, the 
regression results might be spurious since the determinants might proxy for other variables. Thus, 
further study is required on what characteristics can influence, and how they influence, the strength 
of the intra-industry effects of earnings restatement. Researchers can also study whether the 
intra-industry effects vary by the reason of earnings restatement. For example, the intra-industry 
effect might be more important when earnings restatement is due to improper revenue recognition 
than when it is due to other reasons because the former directly influences investors’ perception of 
the profitability of the industry.
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6. Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation studies three topics of earnings restatements due to accounting irregularities.
In the first topic, we discriminate between the market efficiency hypothesis and the 
underreaction hypothesis by testing the stock price performance of restating firms in the six 
months and one year following earnings restatement announcements. Previous studies on the 
post-announcement stock price performance of the restating firms rely only on the CAR approach 
and conclude that investors underreact to earnings restatements, leading the stock prices of the 
restating firms to drift down in the post-announcement period. This dissertation uses three major 
approaches: the CAR, BHAR, and calendar time portfolio approaches. Using the CAR and 
calendar time portfolio approaches, we do not detect post-announcement abnormal performance 
and the results are robust. Using the BHAR approach, we find that restating firms underperform 
the market but not their control firms. This result suggests that restating firms underperform the 
market because of other firm characteristics, such as size, BM ratio, and momentum, rather than 
earnings restatement. Overall, the results are consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis. It 
should be noted, however, this study might not be comparable to the previous studies on this topic 
because the sample period and data sources are different. It is possible that the correctness of 
investors’ evaluation of earnings restatements changes over time. During our sample period, 
concerns over improper accounting practices were very intensive, making it less likely that 
investors would underreact to earnings restatement announcements.
In the second topic, we test the naive extrapolation hypothesis by examining the stock price 
response to earnings restatements. This dissertation shows that the naive extrapolation hypothesis 
predicts two possible relations between the stock price reaction and the glamour/value stock 
characteristics. We perform univariate and multivariate tests to detect the pattern. Besides the 
variables used by Lakonishok et al. (1994,1997), such as the BM ratio, the combination of the BM 
ratio and the past sales growth, and the combination of CP ratio and past sales growth, we also use 
the industry-adjusted BM ratio to identify glamour stocks and value stocks. The empirical results
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of this study do not support the naive extrapolation hypothesis. However, the interpretation of 
these results is limited by the short sample period and small sample size. To test hypotheses on 
investor behavior, it would be ideal to have a sample period of twenty years or longer. Also, this 
study might not be generalized since we restrict our sample to firms that involve accounting 
irregularities. These firms might be very different from other firms.
In the third topic, we test whether earnings restatement has the contagion effect and the 
competitive effect. Different from the extant information transfer literature, we use the historical 
SIC code, rather than the current SIC code, to identify rivals of the restating firms. We contend this 
can lead to more precise match of the rival firms. We examine the average CAR of the peer 
portfolios around the announcement date but detect significant abnormal return in only 24 of the 
203 industries and no significant abnormal return on the aggregation level. Moreover, we do not 
detect significant abnormal returns in the industry subgroups stratified by industry concentration, 
leverage, and cash flow similarity. Our test on the earnings restatement announced by industry 
leaders does not generate significant abnormal returns. Nevertheless, the regression results suggest 
that the CAR of the peer portfolio is significantly correlated with the industry leverage, cash flow 
similarity, and the CAR of the restating firm. Thus, our empirical results on the intra-industry 
effect of earnings restatement are mixed.
We found one problem in the third topic. While investigating the data, we find that about one 
third of the stocks of the restating firms experience positive abnormal returns upon earnings 
restatements. There are two possible reasons: first, the earnings restatement announcements come 
with other good news which we did not find in the Factiva news database. If this good news have 
stronger impact on the stock prices than the earnings restatement announcements do, stocks of the 
restating firm can experience positive abnormal returns; second, some earnings restatement 
announcements convey better-than-expectation news to the market. Prior to earnings restatement, 
some restating firms are discovered with improper accounting practice and/or are under 
investigation. In these cases, the stock price of the restating firms might already reflect the
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increasing uncertainty and investors’ expectation that the firm’s earnings potential is worse than it 
stated. If an earnings restatement reveals information that the restating firm is not as bad as 
investors expected, it might provide good news for the stocks of the restating firm and lead to 
positive abnormal returns of the stocks. If the first reason is the only reason, there is no problem in 
this study because no event study can explore all the factors that affect the stock prices in the event 
day window and it is assumed that the probability of unknown good news and unknown bad news 
is fifty-fifty. If the second reason is true, then our test is not precise since when earnings 
restatement announcements convey better-than-expectation news to investors, its contagion effect 
is positive while its competitive effect is negative. Accordingly, the relation between the total 
intra-industry effect and the determinants when earnings restatement announcements convey 
better-than-expectation news will be opposite to when they bring bad news. In this case, it would 
be better to study the intra-industry effects separately on two subsamples: a subsample when the 
announcements bring bad news and a subsample when the announcements bring good news. Since 
we cannot decide whether or for which announcements the second reason is true, we cannot 
separate the sample. Further studies are needed to overcome this defect.
Besides the three topics, this dissertation also documents some characteristics of the restating 
firms. We find that restating firms have raw BM ratio similar to that of the market but adjusted BM 
ratio significantly larger than zero, suggesting that restating firms concentrate in industries with 
more growth opportunities but they are considered as riskier or having less growth opportunities 
than their non-restating peers. Restating firms have higher leverage than their industry, consistent 
with the notion that one of the motivations for restating firms to manipulate their earnings is to 
attract external financing at a lower cost. Finally, different from the previous findings, restating 
firms in our sample period have significantly higher than average market capitalization. This 
discrepancy is due to the drastic increase in the number of large companies restating earnings 
figures.
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Appendix 1. GARCH-Adjusted CAR
The Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model was 
introduced by Bollerslev (1986). The basic idea of the model is that the variance ofet depends on 
past volatilities going back a large number of periods while it is difficult to estimate all these 
parameters. The GARCH model solves this problem by replacing these many lagged values ofeit 
with only one or two lagged values of the variance ofet.
Corhay and Rad (1996) show that since stock returns series generally exhibit time-varying 
volatility, a GARCH-adjusted market model leads to more efficient estimators of abnormal return 
than a market model estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The GARCH (1,1) 
adjusted market model is the following:
Ru = a, + PtRmt + s it
=  a i0  a i £ i , t - \  +
where eit is the residual term; is the information set of all information through date t on firm 
i; hjt is the conditional variance of firm i; and D is a student-t distribution with d degrees of 
freedom. The GARCH-adjusted abnormal return is the predicted error and the CAR is the sum of 
the abnormal returns in the event-date window.
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Appendix 2. CAARs and Test Statistics
The conventional and precision-weighted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are 
defined as:
WCARTi Ti = £  Y ^ j -ARj,
j=1 /=r,
where Tj and T2 are the beginning and the end of the event period; ARjt is the abnormal returns 
for stock j on day t; Wj is the weight of the abnormal return. For conventional CAAR, Wj=l/N. N is 
the number of firms. For precision-weighted CAAR,
W;j ir , .-j
L j Z A f
sARj, , the maximum likelihood estimate of the variance of the abnormal return of stock i, is
defined as:
=si 1 + --- + ----5^ - ^ ----
* J D  V  ( R - P  V
j  2 - ,k = T D b K «<>
where
D j-2
Rmt is the observed return on the market index on day t, is the mean market return over the 
estimation period and Dj is the number of non-missing trading day returns in the D-day interval 
TDb through TDe used to estimate the parameters for firm j. The Patell (1976) test statistic for the 
null hypothesis of zero abnormal return is
i N
where z t, ,r2 is the z-statistic of the CAR of stock j and
1 T2 
z JTT = . Y saru
Where
AR.  D - 2
SARji = , and Qtut2 = iT2~ T\ + T ,
S ARj, U j  -  4
Boehmer, et al. (1991) develop the standardized cross-sectional (SCS) test by extending the 
Patell test to allow for a possible variance increase on an event date. For day t, the test statistic for
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the null hypothesis that the CAR=0 is
N
Z S C A R tu ,t2,
Z N 1/2si y  *SCAR„
where N is the number of stocks in the portfolio; T1 and T2 are the beginning and the end of the 
event period; and
s s c a r „ =  ~ ~ J ^ j S C A R Ti i  t 2 . )
IV *■ j = l  •*» j =]
where the SCART T. denotes the standardized CAR for stock j and is defined as
SCART -r — CARp T / sr jn
■y ’ 2 j  C A K n j , T 2 j
where C A R p and scarTIj T1j denote the CAR and the estimated variance of stock j in 
event period (Ti,T2).
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Appendix 3. Bootstrapped Approach with Skewness-Adjusted t-Statistic
To calculate the BHAR of restating firms using daily returns, we use the formula suggested by 
Cowan (2002):
i ^ w=[na+^ )-i]-[a+Vr-M)-i]-A[fla+^ )-i]
1=2 1=2
where Rjt and Rmt are the return of sample firm j and the market return in period t. T is 255 or 
the delisting date, whichever comes first. and Pj are the intercept and slop terms of the
market model, respectively. Since the conventional t-statistic is subject to skewness bias, 
especially using the daily returns, Lyon, et al. (1999) advocate the use of bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic because it yields well-specified test statistics. The bootstrapping 
approach proceeds as follow: From the original sample of size n, draw 1000 bootstrapped 
resamples of size nb = n/4. In each resample, the skewness-adjusted t-statistic is calculated as:
3 6  nb
where
p ARb - A R  . Y ( ARbi - ARb?
Sb =:---- TT^T, 311(1 h =  —<rb(AR) nba b(AR)
The tbsa and Sb are the bootstrapped resample analogues of the skewness-adjusted t-statistic and 
standard deviation from the original sample for the b = 1, 2, 3, ... 1000 resample. The null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal return is rejected at the a  significant level if tsa < xi* or tsa > xu*, or: 
Pr[tsab <x,*] = Pr[tsab >  xu*] =cr/2
where the Xi* and xu* are the lower and upper critical value for the transformed tsa calculated 
from the 1 0 0 0  resamples.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Restating Firms and All the COMPUSTAT Firms
Panel A Book-to-market ratio
Year n Restating firms N All firms Diff z-stat Industry adjusted t-stat
1997 61 0.426 (0.572) 33032 0.458 (0.648) -0.032 (-0.076) -0.71 0.022(0.153) 1.95
1998 70 0.407 (0.502) 32633 0.465 (0.772) -0.058 (-0.27) -1.79 -0.026 (0.023) 0.54
1999 12 2 0.498 (0.694) 31348 0.572(1.009) -0.074 (-0.315) -1.78 -0.010(0.153) 2.43*
2 0 0 0 155 0.598 (0.854) 31629 0.557 (0.983) 0.041 (-0.129) 1.15 0.091 (0.271) 4.05**
2 0 0 1 173 0.631 (1.514) 30032 0.703 (1.837) -0.072 (-0.323) -1.64 -0.042 (0.371) 1.75
2 0 0 2 91 0.572 (1.382) 27145 0.646 (1.774) -0.074 (-0.392) -0.15 0.007 (0.353) 2.06*
Total 672 0.533 (1.004) 185819 0.548 (1.145) -0.015 (-0.141) -0.35 0 (0.249) 3.89**
Panel B Market value (Million dollars)
Year N Restating firms N All firms Diff z-stat Industry adjusted t-stat
1997 64 60.65 (550.80) 36827 96.44(1034.13) -35.79 (-483.33) -0.94 -22.13 (379.02) 1.81
1998 70 101.53 (2450.27) 36857 101.29 (1292.68) 0.24(1157.59) 0.70 37.41 (2366.71) 2.26*
1999 128 149.51 (2234.65) 36404 87.63 (1566.89) 61.88 (667.76) 2.99** 34.19(1737.54) 2.06*
2 0 0 0 166 128.31 (1902.66) 37222 94.44 (1935.09) 33.87 (-32.43) 2.15* 6.142(1815.02) 2.07*
2 0 0 1 183 306.07 (2796.24) 35970 66.23 (1580.11) 239.84(1216.13) 7.98** 145.83 (2601.81) 4.09**
2 0 0 2 92 341.35 (2695.20) 33886 72.01 (1496.68) 269.34(1198.52) 5.74** 61.67(1716.04) 2.16*
Total 703 173.00 (2230.89) 217166 86.57 (1484.35) 86.43 (746.54) 8.44** 38.84(1921.11) 5.66**
PanelC Total debt / Total asset
Year N Restating firms N All firms Diff z-stat Industry adjusted t-stat
1997 64 0.302 (0.330) 40002 0.194(0.513) 0.108 (-0.184) 3.11** 0.101 (0.107) 4.10**
1998 71 0.215 (0.234) 39410 0.206 (0.386) 0.085 (-0.152) -0.18 0.276 (0.661) 3.17**
1999 132 0.235 (0.309) 40310 0.217(0.486) 0.175 (-0.177) 0.47 0.570 (0.116) 3.66**
2 0 0 0 167 0 .2 2 2  (0.281) 40616 0.206 (0.601) 0.159 (-0.320) 0.46 0.305 (0.947) 4 11**
2 0 0 1 192 0.221 (0.269) 37973 0.208 (0.900) -0.069 (-0.630) 0.65 0.083 (0.520) 3.52**
2 0 0 2 96 0.240(0.281) 34591 0.207 (0.132) 0.326 (-0.149) 0.84 -0.055 (0.342) 1.55
Total 722 0.234 (0.283) 232902 0.206 (0.685) 0.28 (-0.402) 2 .1 0 * 0.185 (0.779) 7.87**
The sample includes publicly traded companies announcing earnings restatement during January 1997 through June 2002. Panel A shows the
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median (mean) of book-to-market ratio of restating firms and all the COMPUSTAT firms; panel B shows the median (mean) market value (unit: 
millions dollars); panel C shows the median (mean) of the ratio of total debt to total assets; n denotes the number of restating firms with 
non-negative value; N denotes all the firms with non-negative value. Diff. is the difference between the median (mean) of the restating firms and 
those of all the COMPUSTAT firms. The median (mean) value of all the COMPUSTAT firms is the median (mean) value at the beginning of every 
quarter in the sample period. The financial figures of each restating firms are collected at the end of the quarter prior to the restatement 
announcement. Wilcoxcon test is performed to examine the difference between the restating firms and all the COMPUSTAT firms. Normal 
approximation Z is presented. Industry-adjusted value is also calculated to check whether industry clustering influences the results. The 
industry-adjusted indicators are calculated by substracting the median of the restating firm’s industry from the raw indicator of the restating firms at 
the end of quarter proceeding the announcement. Firms in the same industry are matched by 4-digit historical SIC code. *, and ** denote statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.
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Table 2. Abnormal Returns of Earnings Restatement Announcement
Day Obs. Mean 
Abnormal 
Return (%)
Median 
Abnormal 
Return (%)
Positive:
Negative
Standardized
z-stat
General
Sign
z-stat
-1 0 517 -0.44 -0.30 229:288 -1.999* -1.188
-9 517 -0.08 -0.24 243:274 -0.809 0.046
-8 517 -0.38 -0 .21 233:284 -1.59 -0.835
-7 517 -0.61 -0.28 231:286 -2.754** -1 .0 1 2
-6 517 0.06 -0.08 252:265 0.266 0.839
-5 517 -0.43 -0.36 225:292 -1.711 -1.54
-4 517 -0.17 -0.47 222:295 -0.811 -1.805
-3 517 -0.94 -0.49 209:308 -2.994** -2.950**
-2 516 -0 .2 1 -0.14 246:270 -1.413 0.352
-1 515 -0.24 -0.16 241:274 -0.461 -0.048
0 510 -2.89 -1.01 204:306 -6.141** -3.123**
1 505 -4.39 -1.41 187:318 -7.321** .4 .4 4 5 **
2 507 0.04 -0.29 235:272 0.388 -0.2,48
3 507 0 .1 2 -0.17 240:267 -0.218 0.197
4 506 -0.09 -0.24 230:276 -0.357 -0.652
5 507 0 .0 0 -0.19 239:268 -0.591 0.108
6 508 -0 .0 2 -0 .1 0 242:266 -0.175 0.333
7 508 -0.25 -0.25 237:271 -0.896 -0 .1 1 2
8 506 -0.27 -0 .2 2 233:273 -0.865 -0.385
9 506 -0.61 -0 .11 242:264 -1.161 0.417
10
CAR
506 -0.24 -0.15 238:268 -1.062 0.061
(-1,+1)515 -7.40 -3.62 165:350 -9.227** -6.759**
(-5,+5) 517 -9.05 -4.10 184:333 -8.630** -5.154**
The sample period is from January 1997 through June 2002. The abnormal returns are the 
difference between the actual return and the predicted returns calculated by the market model. The 
market return is the equal-weighted CRSP market Index. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. 
*, and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, using a 2-tail test.
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Table 3. GARCH-Adjusted Abnormal Returns of Earnings Restatement Announcement
Day Obs. Mean 
Abnormal 
Return (%)
Median 
Abnormal 
Return (%)
Positive:
Negative
t-stat Generalized
SignZ
-9 517 -0.06 -0.19 243:274 -0.289 -0.061
-8 517 -0.36 -0.25 236:281 -1.642 -0.678
-7 517 -0.58 -0.25 230:287 -2.640** -1.207
-6 517 0.09 -0 .1 2 246:271 0.388 0.203
-5 517 -0.42 -0.36 224:293 -1.878 -1.735
-4 517 -0.16 -0.41 221:296 -0.715 -2 .0 0 0 *
-3 517 -0.93 -0.46 204:313 -4.187*** -3 4 9 7 ***
-2 516 -0 .2 0 -0 .1 2 241:275 -0.913 -0.196
-1 515 -0.25 -0.19 239:276 -1.118 -0.331
0 510 -2.90 -0.94 204:306 -13.128*** -3.229**
1 505 -4.38 -1.48 187:318 -19.798*** -4.550***
2 507 0.07 -0.18 239:268 0.294 0 .0 0 2
3 507 0.15 -0.13 241:266 0.665 0.18
4 506 -0.08 -0.33 233:273 -0.366 -0.491
5 507 0 .01 -0.17 240:267 0.032 0.091
6 508 0.04 -0.09 243:265 0.16 0.315
7 508 -0.24 -0 .2 2 239:269 -1.065 -0.04
8 506 -0.27 -0.23 234:272 -1.225 -0.402
9 506 -0.61 -0 .1 0 240:266 -2.756** 0.133
10
CAR
506 -0 .21 -0 .1 0 241:265 -0.971 0 .2 2 2
(-1 .+1) 515 -7.42 -3.54 167:348 -9.750*** -6.687***
(-5,+5) 517 -8.96 -3.99 190:327 -8.723*** -4 731***
The sample period is from January 1997 through June 2002. The abnormal returns are the 
difference between the actual return and the predicted returns calculated by the GARCH-adjusted 
market model. The GARCH-adjusted market model is shown in Appendix 1. The market return is 
the equal-weighted CRSP market Index. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. * and ** denote 
statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, using a 2-tail test.
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Table 4. Post-Announcement CARs of Rrestating Firms
Event
Day
Obs. Conventional 
CAR (%)
Precision 
Weighted 
CAR (%)
Positive:
Negative
SCS test 
z-stat
Generalized 
Sign test 
z-stat
(2 ,2 2 ) 510 -2 .2 2 -1.80 229:281 -2.420* -0.905
(23,43) 509 0.11 0.03 241:268 0.058 0 .2 0 2
(44,64) 495 0.27 0.14 228:267 -0.111 -0.375
(65,85) 488 1.23 0.19 251:237 0.146 2.007*
(86,106) 481 -1.19 -1.14 210:271 -1.448 -1.425
(107,128) 471 1.70 1.05 244:227 1.345 2.133*
(129,149) 467 0.42 -0.27 227:240 -0.284 0.739
(150,170) 450 1.01 1.11 238:212 1.246 2.545*
(171,191) 423 0.84 0 .2 2 209:214 -0 .0 0 2 1.034
(192,212) 409 0.65 0.85 190:219 0.82 -0.181
(213,233) 392 -0 .6 6 -0.47 187:205 -0.524 0.319
(234,255) 367 -0.38 0.09 183:184 0 .1 1 2 1.137
(2,128) 515 -0 .2 2 -1.53 258:257 -0.792 1.454
(2,255) 515 1.48 0 .0 1 262:253 -0.169 1.807
The sample period is from January 1997 through June 2002. CAR is the sum of abnormal returns 
in a period. The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the predicted error 
of the market model. The market return is the equal-weighted CRSP market Index. * denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level, using a 2-tail test. The construction of test statistics for the 
standardized cross-sectional (SCS) test is shown in Appendix 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
Table 5. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns of Restating Firms
Panel A. BHAR calculated by compounding monthly returns
Holding
Period
N Mean 
BHAR (%)
Median 
BHAR (%)
Positive:
Negative
t-stat
6 -month 517 -9.97 -14.62 208:309 -4.86**
1-year 517 -16.93 -24.58 206:311 -4.32**
Panel B. BHAR calculated by compounding daily returns
Holding
Period
N Mean Median Positive: 
BHAR (%) BHAR (%) Negative
Generalized 
Sign z-stat
Skewness 
adj. t-stat
(2 ,2 2 ) 511 -3.16 -2.53 203:308 -3.259** -3.137**
(23,43) 510 -1.37 -1.88 218:292 -1.889 -1.206
(44,64) 496 -0.62 -1.58 216:280 -1.505 -0.563
(65,85) 489 -0.18 -0.90 233:256 0.323 -0.188
(86,106) 482 -2.07 -4.17 190:292 -3.300** -1.913
(107,128) 472 0.38 -0.48 229:243 0.695 0.337
(129,149) 467 0.27 -2 .1 0 206:261 -1.216 0.245
(150,170) 450 0.26 -0.44 219:231 0.742 0.228
(171,191) 423 -1.19 -1.68 185:238 -1.313 -1.034
(192,212) 409 -0.49 -2.28 173:236 -1.873 -0.435
(213,233) 392 -1.49 -2.54 172:220 -1.207 -1.186
(234,255) 367 -1.13 -1.65 171:196 -0.125 -0.869
(2,128) 516 -16.39 -12.40 190:326 -4.597** -6.046**
(2,255) 516 -64.03 -21.51 192:324 -4.420** -6.673**
The sample period is from January 1997 through June 2002. The buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) is the buy-and-hold return differential between the restating firm and the equal-weighted 
CRSP market Index. Panel A presents the mean and median BHAR calcuated by compounding 
monthly returns; panel B presents the mean and median BHAR calcualted by compounding daily 
returns. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, using a 2-tail 
test.
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Table 6. Buy-and-Hold Returns of the Restating Firms and Contorl Firms and Return Differential
Holding
Period
N Sample Firms Control Firms AHAR t-stat
Mean Median 
BHR (%) BHR (%) t-stat
Mean Median 
BHR (%) BHR (%) t-stat
1st month 459 -1.98 -1.53 -1.75 -1.74 -1.50 -1.97 -0.40 -0.97
2 nd month 456 -0.25 -0.78 -0 .2 0 0.46 -0.42 0.45 -0.45 -0.17
3rd month 447 2.09 0.07 1.69 0.43 0 .0 0 0.49 0.73 -0.74
4th month 443 -0 .2 0 -0.95 -0.19 1.92 -1.11 1.26 -1.08 0.16
5th month 438 -0.17 -1.69 -0.14 -0.34 0.16 -0.36 -0.34 -0.34
6 th month 432 1.42 0 .0 0 1.15 0.18 -0.48 0 .2 0 1.78 1.14
7th month 429 -1.08 -2.03 -0.96 -0.51 -0.48 -0.56 -0.83 -1.31
8 th month 413 0.93 0 .0 0 0.76 2.75 0.23 2.28 -1.15 -0.42
9th month 386 0.67 0 .0 0 0.58 1.25 0 .0 0 1.14 -0.15 0 .0 0
10 th month 373 1.45 -0 .0 2 1.25 3.10 0.75 2.56* -1.44 -0 .6 8
11th month 359 0.76 -0.63 0.56 1.16 -0.05 0.82 0.79 0 .0 0
12 th month 337 0 .1 0 -0.89 0.07 2.81 0.50 2.05 -1.65 -1.79
6 -month 459 -1.09 -3.98 -0.41 0.13 -3.15 0.04 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
1-year 459 4.51 -6.38 1.07 16.40 0.89 2.99* -7.11 -1.03
The sample period is from January 1997 through June 2002. For each restating firm, we identify a set of firms that have market value and 
book-to-market ratio between 70 percent and 130 percent of those values of the restatig firm at the end of the quarter prior to earnings restatement. 
The firm in this set and also have past one year stock returns closest to that of the restating firm is selected as the control firm. The buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) is the buy-and-hold return differential between the restating firm and its control firm. AHAR is the average BHAR of the 
sample firms. * denote statistical significance at the 5% level, using the 2-tail test.
6 6
Table 7. Equal Weighted Calendar Time Portfolio Abnormal Returns
Panel A. 1 -year post-announcement performance
Intercept MKRET SMB HML MOMT HIG LOW Adj. R2
(1) 0.881 0.989 0.825 0.087 -0.425 0.765
(1.57) (7.67**) (6.67**) (0.54) (-5.24)
(2) 0.191 1.018 0.787 0.062 -0.417 2.060 0.265 0.768
(0.24) (7.86**) (5.97**) (0.37) (-5.16**) (1.65) (0.18)
Panel B. 6 -month post-announcement performance
Intercept MKRET SMB HML MOMT HIG LOW Adj. R2
(1) 1.120 0.878 0.756 -0.127 -0.514 0.692
(1.63) (5.55**) (5.09**) (-0.65) (-5.04**)
(2) 1.985 0.898 0.716 -0.154 -0.507 -0.743 -2.407 0.693
(1.95) (5.62**) (4.69**) (-0.78) (-4.96**) (-0.48) (-1.46)
Panel C. 1-year post-announcement performance
Period Intercept MKRET SMB HML MOMT Adj. R2
06/1997- 0.469 0.680 0.795 -0.821 -0.798 0.729
03/2000 (0.56) (3.64**) (4.49**) (-2.30*) (-3.86**)
04/2000- 1.323 1.186 0.716 0.236 -0.376 0.830
12/2002 (1.69) (6.99**) (4.39**) (1.23) (-3.97**)
Panel D. 6 -month post-announcement performance
Period Intercept MKRET SMB HML MOMT Adj. R2
04/1997- 1.217 0.475 0.733 -0.985 -0.876 0.670
03/2002 (1.34) (2.28*) (3.79**) (-2.53*) (-4.17**)
04/2000- 0.761 1.204 0.701 0.182 -0.452 0.767
08/2002 (0.73) (5.45**) (3.30**) (0.73) (-3.63)
Panel A measures the performance of stocks that have earnings restatement in the past one year 
and the estimation period is from June 1997 through December 2002. Panel B measures the 
performance of stocks that have earnings restatement in the past six months and the estimation 
period is from April 1997 through August 2002. Panel C and Panel D divide the estimation period 
in Panel A and Panel B, respectively, into two estimation periods and run the regressions. The 
dependent variable is the monthly portfolio return for restating firms in excess of the one-month 
risk-free rate (proxied by one-month Treasury bill rate); MRET is the excess return on a broad 
market portfolio; SMB is the return differential between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio 
of large stocks; HML is the return differential between portfolio of high book-to-market ratio 
stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market ratio stocks; MOMT is the return differential between 
a portfolio with high returns in the past one year and a portfolio with low returns in the past one 
year; HIG and LOW are two dummy variables of the frequency of earnings restatement. The 
frequency of earnings restatement is calculated by dividing the number of firms in the 
calendar-time portfolio each month by the total number of firms having return data in the CRSP in 
that month. HIG is equal to 1 if the number of earnings restatement in that month lies above the 
seventieth percentile in all the months and zero otherwise; while LOW is equal to 1 if the number
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of earnings restatement is below thirtieth percentile of all monthly activities and zero otherwise. 
Since the small number of stocks included in the portfolio at the beginning and the end of the 
sample perioid might be driven by the short period of restatement records, LOW is equal to to 0 for 
the 1-year post-announcement portfolios within the June 1997 -  December 1997 and August 2002
-  December 2002 periods, and for the 6 -month post-announcement portflios within the April 1997
-  June 1997 and August 2002 -  September 2002 periods, t-value is in the parenthesis. * denotes 
significant at 5 percent level; ** denotes significant at 1 percent level.
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Table 8. CARs and Restatement Magnitude of Stocks in the Adjusted-BM Ratio Deciles
BM nu, Obs. decile ABM MAG CR3d C R lld GR3d G R lld
1 97 0.913 (1.257) -1.633 (-14.026) -4.530 (-7.763) -2.499 (-6.228) -4.506 (-7.859) -1.118 (-6.649)
2 96 0.227 (0.241) -2.645 (-1.752) -1.917 (-4.720) -3.919 (-7.262) -2.213 (-4.745) -2.476 (-7.146)
3 96 0  (0 .0 1 2 ) -5.651 (-15.635) -4.864 (-9.909) -7.002 (-11.893) -4.838 (-9.930) -7.627 (-11.701)
4 96 -0.155 (-0.161) -3.676 (-7.684) -3.315 (-7.865) -4.409 (-11.426) -3.687 (-7.865) -4.631 (-11.272)
5 96 -0.442 (-0.617) -3.865 (-7.502) -3.303 (-7.700) -5.911 (-10.352) -3.351 (-7.771) -5.471 (-10.246)
z-stat (1& 3) 1 2 .0 0 ** 0.95 0.76 1.94* 0.75 1.92*
z-stat (3 &5) 1 2 .0 0 ** 0.08 -1.15 -0.39 -1 .1 2 -0.41
z-stat (1 & 5) 1 2 .0 0 ** 1.09 -0 .2 2 1.50 -0.16 1.53
The sample is divided by the industry-adjusted BM ratio (ABM) into five deciles, decile 1 containing stocks with the highest rank in ABM. Industries are 
identified by the 4-digit historical SIC code in the event year. Obs. is the number of earnings restatement in each subgroup. The number of observation with 
nonmissing value in MAG is much smaller than the Obs. MAG is the cumulative net effect of earnings restatement on the net income of the restating firm 
scaled by the firm’s shareholder equity at the end of the quarter when the restatement is announced; CR3d and CRlld denote conventional cumulative 
abnormal return in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, respectively; GR3d and GRlld are the GARCH-adjusted CAR in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, 
respectively. The number in the parenthesis is the mean. The z-statistic measures the significance of the difference between the two deciles indicated in the 
following parenthesis. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 9. Response Coefficients of Five Adjusted-BM Ratio Deciles
BM Obs. CR3d =-a+/?MAGt +et C R lld =or+/?MAGt +et GR3d =a+/?MAG, +€t G R lld =a+/3MAGt +et
Decile Intercept MAG Adj.R2 Intercept MAG Adj.R2 Intercept MAG Adj.R2 Intercept MAG Adj.R2
1 36 -7.030
(-1.990)
-0.049
(-0.755)
-0 .0 1 2 -3.364
(-1.049)
0.132
(2.223*)
0 .1 0 1 -7.285
(-2 .0 1 0 )
-0.049
(-0.732)
-0.013 -4.380
(-1.249)
0.131
(2 .0 1 2 )
0.080
2 40 -5.518
(-2.889**)
-0.019
(-0.219)
-0.025 -3.949
(-1.505)
0.197
(1.675)
0.044 -5.732
(-2.969**)
-0 .0 2 0
(-0.234)
-0.025 -4.290
(-1 .6 8 8 )
0.209
(1.835)
0.057
3 41 -6.995
(-2.473*)
0.114
(1.634)
0.040 -4.700
(-1.291)
0.168
(1 .8 6 6 )
0.058 -7.229
(-2.497*)
0.106
(1.482)
0.029 -4.399
(-1.198)
0.161
(1.772)
0.051
4 48 -7.864
(-2.475*)
0.161
(0.936)
-0.003 -13.594
(-3.597**)
0.182
(0.890)
-0.004 -7.865
(-2.471*)
0.157
(0.912)
-0.004 -13.622
(-3.606**)
0.161
(0.788)
-0.008
5 35 -4.971
(-2.790**)
0.036
(0.403)
-0.025 -6.305
(-1.915)
0.131
(0.791)
-0 .0 1 1 -4.970
(-2.809**)
0.069
(0.776)
-0 .0 1 2 -6.379
(-1.923)
0.148
(0.884)
-0.006
The sample is divided by the industry-adjusted BM ratio (ABM) into five deciles, decile 1 containing stocks with the highest rank in ABM. 
Industries are identified by the 4-digit historic SIC code. MAG is the cumulative net effect of earnings restatement on the net income of the restating 
firm scaled by the firm’s shareholder equity at the end of the quarter when the restatement is announced; CR3d and C R lld  denote conventional 
cumulative abnormal return in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, respectively; GR3d and G R lld  are the GARCH-adjusted CAR in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) 
window, respectively. The number in the parenthesis is the mean CAR. The z-statistic measures significance of the difference between decile 1 and 
decile 5. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 10. Regressions of CAR on the Restatement Magnitude and Adjusted-BM Ratio
Panel A
Dep. Whole Sample (Obs. = 199)
Variable Intercept MAG ABM Adj. R2
CR3d -6.90 0 .0 2 -0.18 -0.008
(-5.56**) (0.62) (-0 .11)
C R lld -7.10 0.15 2 .1 0 0.048
(.4.70**) (3.35**) (1 .0 2 )
GR3d -7.04 0 .0 2 -0.28 -0.008
(-5.61**) (0.60) (-0.16)
G R lld -7.21 0.15 1.51 0.044
(-4.71**) (3.26**) (0.73)
PanelB
Dep. Subsample: Low (Obs. = 63) Subsample: High (Obs. = 62)
Variable Intercept MAG ABM Adi. R2 Intercept MAG ABM Adj. R2
CR3d -3.93 -0.05 -2.26 -0.007 -9.42 -0.04 -5.21 -0.017
(-1.30) (-0.93) (-0.87) (-3.28**) (-0.42) (-0.83)
C R lld -2.44 0.14 -0.87 0.083 -13.46 0.03 -8.89 -0 .0 2 0
(-0.79) (2.74**) (-0.33) (2.97**) (0 .2 0 ) (-0.90)
GR3d -3.98 -0.05 -2.46 -0.006 -9.07 -0 .0 2 -4.40 -0.023
(-1.29) (-0.92) (-0.93) (3.16**) (-0.19) (-0.70)
G R lld -2.45 0.14 -1.69 0.080 -12.45 0.04 -6.38 -0.026
(-0.75) (2.63*) (-0.61) (-2.73**) (0.27) (-0.64)
The four measures of abnormal returns are regressed on the restatement magnitude (MAG) and 
industry-adjusted BM ratio (ABM). CR3d and C R lld  denote conventional cumulative abnormal 
return in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, respectively; GR3d and G R lld  are the GARCH-adjusted 
CAR in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, respectively; MAG is the cumulative net effect of earnings 
restatement on the net income of the restating firm scaled by the firm’s shareholder equity at the 
end of the quarter when the restatement is announced; ABM is the industry-adjusted BM ratio 
calculated by substacting from the raw BM ratio the median BM ratio of the restating firm’s 
industry at the end of the quarter prior to the restatement announcement. Industries are identified 
by the 4-digit historical SIC code in the event year. Panel A presents the regression results on the 
whole sample that have nonmissing restating magnitude data; panel B presents regression results 
on the low adjusted-BM ratio subsample (glamour stocks) and high adjusted-BM ratio subsample 
(value stocks). * denotes significant at 5 percent level; * denotes significant at 1 percent level.
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Table 11. Regressions of CAR on the Adjusted-BM Ratio
Panel A
Dep. Whole Sample (Obs. = 477)
Variable Intercept ABM Adj. R2
CR3d -7.53 -0.39 -0 .0 0 2
(-9.33**) (-0.44)
C R lld -9.64 1 .2 2 0 .0 0 0
(-8.90**) (1 .0 2 )
GR3d -7.57 -0.40 -0 .0 0 2
(-9.33**) (-0.44)
G R lld -9.55 0.79 -0 .0 0 1
(-8.74**) (0.56)
Panel B
Dep. Subsample : Low (Obs. = 158) Subsample: High (Obs. = 154)
Variable Intercept ABM Adj. R2 Intercept ABM Adj.R2
CR3d -8.84 -2.78 0.007 -5.92 -0.64 -0.005
(-5.54**) (-1.46) (-3.15**) (-0.46)
C R lld -12.52 -5.90 0.029 -9.13 3.01 0 .011
(-6.04**) (-2.38*) (-3.74**) (-1.64)
GR3d -8.83 -2.69 0.006 -5.96 -0.69 -0.005
(-5.52**) (-1.40) (-3.14**) (-0.49)
G R lld -12.62 -6.59 0.037 -9.02 2.60 0.006
(-6.06**) (-2.65**) (-3.66**) (1.41)
The four measures of abnormal returns are regressed on the industry-adjusted BM ratio. CR3d and 
C R lld  denote conventional cumulative abnormal return in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, 
respectively; GR3d and G R lld  are the GARCH-adjusted CAR in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, 
respectively; ABM is the industry-adjusted BM ratio calculated by substacting from the raw BM 
ratio the median BM ratio of the restating firm’s industry at the end of the quarter prior to the 
restatement announcement. Industries are identified by the 4-digit historic SIC code in the event 
year. Panel A presents the regression results on the whole sample; panel B presents regression 
results on the low adjusted-BM ratio subsample (glamour stocks) and high adjusted-BM ratio 
subsample (value stocks). * denotes significant at 5 percent level; * denotes significant at 1 percent 
level.
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Table 12. Regressions of CARs on the Restating Magnitude and Raw BM ratio
Panel A
Dep. Whole Sample (Obs. = 192)
Variable Intercept MAG BM Adj. R2
CR3d -6.67 0.03 -0.005 -0.007
(-4.22**) (0.72) (-0.33)
C R lld -8.59 0.14 0.025 0.053
(-4.44**) (3.13**) (1.36)
GR3d -6.78 0.026 -0.006 -0.007
(.4 2 4 **) (0.70) (-0.38)
G R lld -8.48 0.14 0 .0 2 0 0.047
(-4.33**) (3.09**) (1.07)
Panel B
Dep. Subsample: Low (Obs. = 6 8 ) Subsample: High (Obs. == 38)
Variable Intercept MAG BM Adj.R2 Intercept MAG BM Adj. R2
CR3d -14.93 -0.04 -0.33 0.013 -5.37 0.01 -0 .01 -0.045
(-3.25*) (-0.73) (-1.61) (-1.08) (0.05) (-0.59)
C R lld -24.28 0.07 0.77 0 .1 0 0 -6.51 0.25 0 .01 0.059
(-3.97**) (1 .0 1 ) (2.79**) (-1.31) (2.01) (0.47)
GR3d -14.94 -0.04 0.32 0 .0 1 0 -5.35 0.02 -0 .0 2 -0.044
(-3.22**) (-0.73) (1.53) (-1.04) (0.13) (-0.63)
G R lld -23.99 0.07 0.76 0.096 -6.43 0.29 0 .01 0.070
(-3.91**) (1 .0 0 ) (2.75**) (-1.21) (2.17*) (-0.26)
Panel C
Dep. Low BM & High GS (Obs. = 11) High BM & Low GS (Obs . = 2 2 )
Variable Intercept MAG BM Adj. R2 Intercept MAG BM Adj. R2
CR3d -0.16 -0 .1 0 0 .01 -0.196 -0.29 -0.01 -0.03 -0.057
(-0.03) (-0.42) (0.03) (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.89)
C R lld -4.67 0.23 0.17 -0.148 -0.92 0.23 0 .0 0 -0 .0 2 1
(-0.54) (0.53) (0.31) (-0.15) (1.24) (0 .0 1 )
GR3d 0.31 -0.11 0 .0 0 -0.192 -0.35 0.001 -0.03 -0.056
(0.06) (-0.44) (0 .0 0 ) (-0.05) (0.01) (-0.91)
G R lld -4.01 0.24 0 .1 0 -0.152 -1.37 0.29 -0 .0 0 -0.009
(-0.46) (0.56) (0.24) (-0.20) (1.35) (-0.13)
The four measures of abnormal returns are regressed on the restating magnitude and raw BM ratio. 
CR3d, CR1 Id, GR3d, GR1 Id, and MAG are the same as those defined in Table 10; BM is the raw 
BM ratio of the restating firm at the end of the year prior to earnings restatement; GS is the 
w e ig h te d  ra n k  o f  th e  sa les  g ro w th  in  th e  5 y ea rs  p r io r  to  ea rn in g s  resta tem en t. P a n e l A  p re se n ts  th e  
regression results on the whole sample that have nonmissing restating magnitude data; panel B 
presents regression results on the low raw BM ratio subsample (glamour stocks) and high raw BM 
ratio subsample (value stocks); panel C presents regression results on the subsample of restating 
firms with low raw BM ratio and high GS (glamour stocks) and the subsample of restating firms 
with high raw BM ratio and GS (value stocks). * denotes significant at 5 percent level; * denotes
significant at 1 percent level.
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Table 13. Regressions of CARs on the Raw BM Ratio
Panel A
Dep. Whole Sample (Obs. = 495)
Variable Intercept BM Adj. R2
CR3d -8 .11 0 .01 -0 .0 0 2
(-8.30**) (-0.94)
C R lld -11.15 0 .0 2 0.008
(-8.49**) (2.26*)
GR3d -8.13 0 .01 -0.003
(-8.27**) (-0.93)
G R lld -11.05 0 .0 2 0.007
(-8.32**) (2.17*)
Panel B
Dep. Low BM (Obs.:= 166) High BM (Obs. = 118)
Variable Intercept BM Adj.R2 Intercept BM Adj. R2
CR3d -17.03 0.46 0.070 -7.62 0.003 -0.008
(-6 .2 1 **) (3.68**) (-2 .8 8 **) (0.32)
C R lld -23.93 0.62 0.051 -10.15 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 1
(-5.56**) (3.14**) (-2.84**) (1 .12)
GR3d -17.08 0.46 0.068 -7.52 -0.003 -0.008
(-6.17**) (3.63**) (-2.81**) (0.27)
G R lld -23.94 0.63 0.050 -9.90 0 .0 2 0.006
(-5.45**) (3.13**) (-2.74**) (1.03)
Panel C
Dep. Low BM & High GS (Obs. = 30) High BM & Low GS (Obs. == 81)
Variable Intercept BM Adj. R2 Intercept BM Adj. R2
CR3d -12.24 0.28 -0.007 -5.40 -0 .0 1 -0.006
(-1.89) (0 .8 8 ) (-1.57) (-0.75)
C R lld -25.23 0.64 0.017 -9.57 0 .01 -0 .0 1 0
(-2.38*) (-1.23) (-2.06*) (0.42)
GR3d -12.05 0.27 -0 .0 1 0 -5.34 -0 .01 -0.005
(-1 .8 6 ) (0.84) (-1.53) (-0.77)
G R lld -24.53 0.59 0.009 -9.53 0 .01 -0 .011
(-2.30*) (1.13) (-2.04*) (0.40)
The four measures of abnormal returns are regressed on the restatement magnitude and the raw 
BM ratio. CR3d, CR1 Id, GR3d, GR1 Id, MAG, and BM are the same as those defined in Table 12; 
GS is the weighted rank of the sales growth in the past 5 years prior to earnings restatement. Panel 
A presents th e  re g re ss io n  re su lts  on th e  w h o le  sa m p le  th a t h a v e  n o n m iss in g  re s ta tin g  m a g n itu d e  
data; panel B presents regression results on the low raw BM ratio subsample (glamour stocks) and 
high raw BM ratio subsample (value stocks); panel C presents regression results on the subsample 
of restating firms with low raw BM ratio and high GS (glamour stocks) and the subsample of 
restating firms with high raw BM ratio and low GS (value stocks). * denotes significant at 5 
percent level; * denotes significant at 1 percent level.
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Table 14. Regressions of CARs on the Cash Flow/Market Value (CP) Ratio
Panel A
Dep. Whole Sample (Obs. = 355)
Variable Intercept CP Adj. R2
CR3d -7.25 -0 .01 -0 .0 0 2
(-8.18**) (-0.41)
C R lld -8.30 -0 .01 -0 .0 0 2
(-6.72**) (-0.54)
GR3d -7.27 -0 .01 -0 .0 0 2
(-8.15**) (-0.37)
G R lld -8.07 -0 .01 -0 .0 0 2
(-6.49**) (-0.51)
Panel B
Dep. Low CP (Obs. = 97) High CP (Obs. = 92)
Variable Intercept CP Adj. R2 Intercept CP Adj. R*
CR3d -8.28 -0 .01 -0.007 -0.82 -0.19 0.019
(-3.93**) (-0.60) (-0.26) (-1.67)
C R lld -9.12 -0 .0 2 -0.003 -3.35 -0 .0 2 -0 .0 1 1
(-3.07**) (-0.82) (-0.90) (-0.14)
GR3d -8.39 -0 .01 -0.007 -0.79 -0.19 0.019
(-3.90**) (-0.57) (-0.25) (-1 .6 8 )
G R lld -8.92 -0 .0 2 -0.004 -3.60 0 .0 0 -0 .011
(-2.97**) (-0.81) (-0.94) (0 .0 0 )
PanelC
Dep. Low CP & High GS (Obs. = 7) High CP & Low GS (Obs. = 67)
Variable Intercept CP Adj. R2 Intercept CP Adj. R2
CR3d -30.96 -0.59 0.444 -1 .2 2 -0 .2 2 0.023
(-3.35*) (-2.56*) (-0.32) (-1.61)
C R lld -54.78 -1.21 0.406 -4.21 -0 .0 2 -0.015
(-2.71*) (-2.41) (-0.98) (-0.13)
GR3d -31.20 -0.60 0.446 -1.18 -0.23 0.023
(-3.32*) (-2.58*) (-0.31) (-1.61)
G R lld -55.75 -1 .22 0.433 -4.23 -0 .0 1 -0.015
(-2.84*) (-2.52*) (-0.96) (-0.07)
The four measures of abnormal returns are regressed on the restating magnitude and the cash flow 
to market value ratio. CR3d, CRlld, GR3d, G Rlld, and MAG are the same as those defined in 
Table 13; CP is the cash-flow-to-market-value ratio of the restating firm at the end of the year prior 
to  ea rn in g s  re s ta te m en t; GS is  th e  w e ig h te d  ra n k  o f  th e  sa les  g ro w th  in  th e  past 5 y ea rs  p r io r  to  
earnings restatement. Panel A presents the regression results on the whole sample that have 
nonmissing restating magnitude data; panel B presents regression results on the low CP subsample 
(glamour stocks) and high CP subsample (value stocks); panel C presents regression results on the 
subsample of restating firms with low CP and high GS (glamour stocks) and the subsample of 
restating firms with high CP and GS (value stocks). * denotes significance at 5 percent level; ** 
denotes significance at 1 percent level.
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Table 15. Regressions of CARs on Adjusted BM ratio and Restatement Reason Dummies
Panel A. Whole Sample (Obs. = 477)
Dep. Intercept ABM R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 Adj. R2
CR3d -5.04 -0.53 -2.62 -6 .1 0 -0.82 3.03 0.94 -2.97 -1.84 -6.17 -0 .0 0 1
(-1.97*) (-0.59) (-0.93) (-1.50) (-0.24) (0 .6 6 ) (0.17) (-0.65) (-0.37) (-1.83)
C R lld -5.43 1 .0 0 -5.13 -3.81 -1 .1 2 0.54 -1.59 -5.27 -12.78 -6.43 -0.003
(-1.58) (0.83) (-1.36) (-0.70) (-0.24) (0.09) (-0 .2 2 ) (-0 .8 6 ) (-1.93) (-1.42)
GR3d -5.04 -0.54 -2 .6 8 -6 .1 2 -0 .8 8 3.04 0.89 -3.20 -2 .0 2 -6.08 -0 .0 0 2
(-1.96) (-0.60) (-0.95) (-1.49) (-0,26) (0 .6 6 ) (0.16) (-0.69) (-0.41) (-1.79)
G R lld -5.34 0.56 -5.15 -3.97 -0.73 0.46 -1.85 -5.82 -13.47 -6.19 -0.003
(-1.54) (0.46) (-1.35) (-0.72) (-0.16) (0.07) (-0.25) (-0.94) (-2 .0 1 ) (-1.35)
Panel B. Low Adjusted BM ratio Subsample (Obs. = 158)
Dep. Intercept ABM R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 Adj.R 2
CR3d -8.04 -2 .6 6 0.70 -3.71 2.74 2.31 4.00 -5.63 6.52 -11.31 0.031
(-1 .8 8 ) (-1.40) (0.15) (-0.56) (0.48) (0.27) (0.50) (-0.65) (0.81) (-2 .0 1 )
C R lld -9.12 -5.93 -2.97 -5.01 2.82 2.62 -0.39 -8.08 6.61 -17.09 0.005
(-1.64) (-2.41*) (-0.49) (-0.59) (0.38) (0.24) (-0.04) (-0.72) (0.63) (-2.34)
GR3d -7.89 -2.54 0 .6 6 -3.87 2.18 1.92 3.94 -5.97 6.29 -11.37 0.028
(-1.84) (-1.34) (0.14) (-0.59) (0.38) (0 .2 2 ) (0.49) (-0.69) (0.78) (-2 .0 1 *)
G R lld -9.20 -6.59 -2.74 -5.30 2.85 1.69 -0.41 -8.40 6.04 -17.21 0.060
(-1.65) (-2.67) (-0.45) (-0.62) (0.38) (0.15) (-0.04) (-0.75) (0.58) (-2.35*)
Panel B. High Adjusted BM ratio Subsample (Obs. = 134)
Dep. Intercept ABM R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 Adj. R2
CR3d -3.45 -1.05 1 .10 -15.28 -3.20 11.05 5.94 -5.51 -24.65 -6.50 0.088
(-0.78) (-0.75) (0.24) (-2.36*) (-0.57) (1.47) (0.48) (-0.73) (-2 .6 6 **) (-1.17)
C R lld -8 .1 0 3.14 0.31 -4.10 -1 .1 2 8.45 -6.41 -5.42 -41.35 1.07 0.058
(-1.37) (1.69) (0.05) (-0.48) (-1 .1 2 ) (0.84) (-0.39) (-0.54) (-3.36**) (0.14)
GR3d -3.43 -1.11 1 .0 2 -15.36 -2.94 1 0 .8 8 5.81 -5.71 -25.05 -6.49 0.086
(-0.76) (-0.78) (0 .2 2 ) (-2.34*) (-0.52) (1.43) (0.46) (-0.74) (-2 .6 8 **) (-1.15)
G R lld -7.63 2.65 -0.17 -4.67 0.07 7.51 -6.65 -6 .2 0 -42.86 0.74 0.057
(-1.28) (1.41) (-0.03) (-0.54) (0 .0 1 ) (0.74) (-0.40) (-0.61) (-3.45) (0 .1 0 )
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The dependent variables are shown in the first column. CR3d, CR1 Id, GR3d, GR1 Id, and ABM are the same as those defined in Table 11; R1 -  R8 
are the dummy variables of restatement reasons. R1 is equal to 1 if the restatement is due to revenue recognition and zero otherwise; R2 is equal to 1 
if the restatement is made to correct errors involving acquisition or merger and zero otherwise; R3 is equal to 1 if  restatement is made to correct 
errors in cost or expense and zero otherwise; R4 is equal to 1 if restatement is securities-related and zero otherwise; R5 is equal to 1 if restatement 
involves related-party transactions and zero otherwise; R6  is equal to 1 if  the restatement involves in-process research and development and zero 
otherwise; R7 is equal to 1 if the restatement involves reclassification of accounting items and zero otherwise; R8 is equal to 1 if the restatement 
involves restructuring, assets, or inventory and zero otherwise. Panel A shows the regressions on the whole sample; Panel B shows the regressions 
on the subsample of restatements with low adjusted-BM ratio; Panel C shows the regressions on the subsample of restatements with high 
adjusted-BM ratio.
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Table 16. Intra-Industry Effects of Earnings Restatement
The sample period is from January 1997 through June 2002. The total sample includes 508 peer 
portfolios. The abnormal return (AR) is the predicted error of the market model. A peer portfolio is 
a value-weighted or equal-weighted portfolio of firms with the same historical four-digit SIC code 
as that of the restating firms at the announcement year. Patell (1976) test is performed to test the 
significance of the abnormal returns. The construction of the z-statistic is shown in Appendix 2. * 
denotes significance at 5 percent level.
Event Obs. Value Weighted Equal Weighted
days Average 
AR (%)
z-stat Average 
AR (%)
z-stat
-5 507 -0 .0 1 2 0.653 0 .0 0 2 -0.363
-4 507 -0.065 -0.395 -0.008 -0.415
-3 507 -0.06 -2.037* -0.007 -1.265
-2 507 0.090 0.658 0.070 -0.133
-1 507 -0.017 -0.586 -0 .0 2 0 -0.713
0 507 0.042 0.442 0.080 1.797*
1 507 -0.051 -0.884 -0.135 -1.284
2 507 0.058 0.569 -0.026 0.093
3 507 0.079 0.757 -0.056 -1.203
4 507 -0.043 -0.061 0.078 0.855
5 507 0.141 1.011 -0.040 -0.150
(-1 ,0 ) 507 0.025 -0 .1 0 2 0.060 0.766
(0 ,1) 507 -0.009 -0.312 -0.055 0.362
(-1 ,1) 507 -0.026 -0.593 -0.075 -0.116
(-5,5) 507 0.162 0.039 0.061 -0.839
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Table 17.11-Day CAARs By Industry
The sample period is from January 1997 through June 2002. For each restating firm, we form a 
value weighted portfolio of firms with the same historical SIC code in the fiscal year prior to 
earnings restatement. Each portfolio return is treated as the return of a stock. For industries that 
have only one peer portfolio, CAAR is the CAR of the peer portfolio; for industries that have more 
than one peer portfolios, CAAR is the average CAR of all the peer portflios in the industry. Patell 
(1976) test is performed to test the significance of the abnormal returns. The construction of the 
z-statistic is shown in Appendix 2. N is the number of earnings restatement (equivalent to the 
number of portfolios in each industry). The industry median of the number of stocks in a portfolio 
is reported. * denotes significance at the 5 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 1 percent 
level.
Industry Historic
SIC
N Median
No.
CAAR z-stat
Gold and Silver Ores 1040 3 31 2 .2 0 0.45
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gs 1311 5 149 0.55 0.41
Oil and Gas Field Expl Svcs 1382 1 2 2.72 0.18
Mng, Quarry Nonmtl Minerals 1400 2 12.5 1.93 0.61
Operative Builders 1531 1 25 -1.58 -0.25
Heavy Constr-Not Bldg Constr 1600 2 8.5 4.32 1.18
Water, Sewer, Pipeline Constr 1623 1 6 -10.58 -1.41
Electrical Work 1731 1 8 8.06 1.14
Food and Kindred Products 2 0 0 0 2 4 -1.41 -0.39
Meat Packing Plants 2011 3 3 0.71 0.13
Dairy Products 2 0 2 0 1 7 4.37 0.58
Can, Frozn, Presrv Fruit and Veg 2030 2 11.5 5.94 1.69*
Can Fruit, Veg, Presrv, Jam, Jel 2033 1 3 -5.13 -0.76
Grain Mill Products 2040 1 10 6.73 1.39
Cookies and Crackers 2052 1 1 11.23 1 .1 0
Fats and Oils 2070 2 2 -11.11 -1.35
Malt Beverages 2082 1 3 3.15 0.47
Tobacco Products 2 1 0 0 1 4 -0 .1 2 -0 .0 2
Carpets and Rugs 2273 1 3 -0.93 -0.13
Mens, Boys Fmsh, Work Clthng 2320 2 16.5 -1.39 -0.48
Womens, Misses, Jrs Outerwear 2330 2 20.5 -3.24 -0.81
Lumber and Wood Pds, Ex Fum 2400 1 4 -8.13 -1.04
Office Furniture, Ex Wood 2522 1 7 2.76 0.36
Public Bldg and Rel Furniture 2531 1 5 -3.75 -1.23
Paper Mills 2621 1 18 -1.65 -0.31
Paperboard Mills 2631 2 5 4.58 0.75
Paperboard Containers, Boxes 2650 1 11 0.32 0.06
Periodical: Pubg, Pubg and Print 2721 1 9 12.83 0.85
Books: Pubg, Pubg and Printing 2731 1 8 2.59 0.47
Commercial Printing 2750 3 23 -2.61 -1.69*
Manifold Business Forms 2761 2 6 -1.62 -0.49
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Blankbooks, Binders, Bookbind 2780 1 3 -2.75 -0.55
Plastics, Resins, Elastomers 2821 1 11 -4.30 -0.46
Pharmaceutical Preparations 2834 9 154 1.54 0.83
In Vitro,In Vivo Diagnostics 2835 1 26 -2.15 -0 .2 2
Biological Pds, Ex Diagnstics 2836 11 106 -1 .2 0 -0.65
Soap, Detergent, Toilet Preps 2840 1 9 -8.61 -2.28*
Special Clean, Polish Preps 2842 2 7 -1.07 -0.54
Perfume, Cosmetic, Toilet Prep 2844 2 23.5 2.26 0.59
Industrial Organic Chemicals 2860 1 12 -0.99 -0.24
Agricultural Chemicals 2870 1 8 -1.55 -0.37
Petroleum Refining 2911 3 19 -1.64 -0.50
Rubber and Plastics Footwear 3021 2 5.5 7.76 1.37
Fabricated Rubber Pds, Nec 3060 3 9 5.13 2.04*
Plastics Products, Nec 3089 2 23.5 0.24 0.11
Glass Pd, Made of Purch Glass 3231 1 1 -20.14 -1.30
Concrete, Gypsum, Plaster Pds 3270 2 7 4.92 1.11
Abrasive, Asbestos, Misc Minrl 3290 1 6 5.19 0.76
Steel Works and Blast Furnaces 3312 2 34.5 -3.14 -1.30
Iron and Steel Foundries 3320 2 2 -0.76 -0 .1 2
Rolling and Draw Nonfer Metal 3350 1 13 -7.05 -3.09**
Cutlery, Handtools, Gen Hrdwr 3420 2 12 -5.21 -1.17
Prefab Metal Bldgs and Comp 3448 1 1 -1.48 -0.28
Coating, Engraving, Allied Svc 3470 1 4 17.52 2.52**
Farm Machinery and Equipment 3523 1 6 5.12 0.76
Construction Machinery and Eq 3531 2 5 4.61 0.78
Oil and Gas Field Machy, Equip 3533 1 16 -7.11 -0.80
Metalworking Machinery and Eq 3540 1 7 -7.12 -1.27
Special Industry Machy, Nec 3559 5 41 0.89 0.52
General Indl Mach and Eq, Nec 3569 1 8 -3.46 -0.97
Computer and Office Equipment 3570 1 2 8.38 0.63
Electronic Computers 3571 2 22.5 11.60 2.37**
Computer Storage Devices 3572 2 25 7.49 0.85
Computer Communications Equip 3576 15 62 -2.07 -1.30
Computer Peripheral Eq, Nec 3577 9 50 -3.31 -1.01
Calculate, Acct Mach, Ex Comp 3578 4 15 2.58 0.85
Refrig and Service Ind Machine 3580 2 6.5 7.42 2.33**
Air-Cond, Heating, Reffig Eq 3585 1 9 -0.16 -0.03
Motors and Generators 3621 1 11 3.35 0.79
Household Appliances 3630 1 6 5.98 2.14*
Electric Housewares and Fans 3634 1 6 3.80 0 .8 6
Electric Lighting, Wiring Eq 3640 2 18.5 -0.52 -0.14
Tele and Telegraph Apparatus 3661 6 60.5 -3.88 -1.35
Radio, TV Broadcast, Comm Eq 3663 6 83 3.04 0.84
Communications Equip, Nec 3669 3 2 2 -5.41 -0.74
Electronic Comp, Accessories 3670 1 9 1.60 0.29
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Semiconductor, Related Device 3674 6 146 -2.35 -0.82
Electronic Connectors 3678 1 11 -4.17 -1.29
Electronic Components, Nec 3679 3 31 -4.22 -0.81
Misc Elec Machy, Eq, Supplies 3690 3 27 1.65 0.50
Motor Vehicle Part, Accessory 3714 4 45 0.38 0.65
Truck Trailers 3715 1 4 7.37 1.05
Motor Homes 3716 1 5 -10.08 -1 .8 6 *
Aircraft Parts, Aux Eq, Nec 3728 2 6.5 8.04 1.71*
Srch, Det, Nav, Guid, Aero Sys 3812 5 2 2 -0.75 -0 .11
Industrial Measurement Instr 3823 1 2 0 7.90 1 .6 6 *
Elec Meas and Test Instruments 3825 7 32 2 .6 6 0.63
Lab Analytical Instruments 3826 1 30 -0 .01 0 .0 0
Optical Instruments and Lenses 3827 1 13 -2 .2 2 -0.23
Meas and Controlling Dev, Nec 3829 1 6 3.22 0.36
Surgical,Med Instr,Apparatus 3841 3 52 1.51 0 .6 8
Ortho,Prosth,Surg Appl,Suply 3842 2 46.5 2.03 0.82
Dental Equipment and Supplies 3843 1 8 -4.24 -0.98
X-Ray and Related Apparatus 3844 3 11 0.69 0.47
Electromedical Apparatus 3845 4 91 -0.44 -0.16
Photographic Equip and Supply 3861 4 13 -0.89 -0.38
Games,Toys,Chid Veh,Ex Dolls 3944 2 12 -14.68 -2.55**
Costume Jewlry,Button,Notion 3960 1 2 13.12 1.46
Misc Manufactumg Industries 3990 3 17 0.80 0.24
Trucking, Except Local 4213 2 36.5 1.91 0.69
Air Transport, Scheduled 4512 1 21 -2.36 -0.40
Transportation Services 4700 1 7 4.39 0.34
Arrange Trans-Freight, Cargo 4731 1 6 -7.16 -1 .2 2
Radiotelephone Communication 4812 1 33 26.58 3.87**
Phone Comm Ex Radiotelephone 4813 6 88.5 0.05 -0.09
Telegraph and Oth Message Comm 4822 1 4 16.74 0.80
Radio Broadcasting Stations 4832 1 17 9.20 1 .6 6 *
Television Broadcast Station 4833 3 2 2 2.18 0.59
Cable and Other Pay TV Svcs 4841 1 30 -6.76 -1.52
Communications Services, Nec 4899 3 25 -0.78 0.03
Electric Services 4911 2 34 -3.20 -1 .0 0
Natural Gas Distribution 4924 3 18 -1.29 -0.52
Electric and Other Serv Comb 4931 3 21 -1.55 -0.72
Gas and Other Serv Combined 4932 1 3 7.30 1.74*
Refuse Systems 4953 1 23 0.75 0.17
Hazardous Waste Management 4955 1 28 12.61 3.07**
Cogeneratn-SM Power Producer 4991 1 1 2 .1 2 0.14
Prof and Coml Eq and Supply-Whsl 5040 1 10 1.87 0.46
Computers and Software-Whsl 5045 2 37.5 -1.79 -0.61
Med, Dental, Hosp Eq-Whsl 5047 2 9.5 -6.80 -1.76*
Metals Service Centers-Whsl 5051 1 9 -2.70 -1 .0 0
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Elec Apparatus and Equip-Whsl 5063 1 7 -1.37 -0.16
Electronic Parts,Eq-Whsl,Nec 5065 4 21 2.08 0.71
Machinery and Equipment-Whsl 5080 1 11 -2 .8 6 -0.50
Industrial Mach and Eq-Whsl 5084 1 9 1.40 0.23
Paper and Paper Products-Whsl 5110 1 7 -6.41 -0.93
Drugs and Proprietary-Whsl 5122 1 2 0 3.64 0.51
Groceries, General Line-Whsl 5141 3 2 -2.71 -0.60
Farm-Product Raw Matl-Whsl 5150 1 2 -4.89 -0 .8 6
Petroleum Bulk Stations-Whsl 5171 1 5 3.69 0.77
Petroleum,Ex Bulk Statn-Whsl 5172 1 9 -4.20 -0.61
Lumber and Oth Bldg Matl-Retl 5211 1 7 6.28 1.08
Department Stores 5311 2 11 2.48 0.67
Variety Stores 5331 2 14.5 -1.01 -0 .21
Grocery Stores 5411 2 18.5 1.16 0.35
Auto Dealers, Gas Stations 5500 2 12.5 -9.58 -2.49**
Auto and Home Supply Stores 5531 1 10 3.70 0.65
Apparel and Accessory Stores 5600 3 10 -3.08 -1 .00
Women's Clothing Stores 5621 2 16 4.57 1.03
Family Clothing Stores 5651 5 2 0 1.73 0.09
Shoe Stores 5661 1 9 6 .2 0 1.45
Home Furniture and Equip Store 5700 2 7 -2.35 -0.49
Furniture Stores 5712 1 2 -10.45 -1.25
Radio,TV,Cons Electr Stores 5731 3 9 -10.43 -2 .1 0 *
Record and Tape Stores 5735 1 4 3.81 0.29
Eating Places 5812 3 114 1.59 0.95
Drug and Proprietary Stores 5912 3 13 1.70 0.57
Jewelry Stores 5944 1 11 10.29 1.61
Catalog, Mail-Order Houses 5961 3 50 5.04 0.90
Retail Stores, Nec 5990 1 16 6.60 1.35
National Commercial Banks 6021 6 12 -0.71 -0.35
State Commercial Banks 6022 1 29 -1 .68 -0.35
Personal Credit institutions 6141 2 19.5 -3.68 -1.32
Misc Business Credit Instn 6159 2 9.5 -0 .2 0 -0.05
Finance Lessors 6172 2 3.5 19.93 2.95**
Finance Services 6199 1 2 4.55 0.81
Security Brokers and Dealers 6211 3 54 2.99 0.79
Investment Advice 6282 3 21 -2.35 -0.73
Life Insurance 6311 1 38 -4.54 -1.04
Accident and Health Insurance 6321 1 12 5.41 1 .10
Hospital and Medical Svc Plans 6324 4 24 -2.94 -1 .10
Fire, Marine, Casualty Ins 6331 6 83 0 .0 0 0.73
Surety Insurance 6351 1 2 2 0.43 0 .1 2
Ins Agents,Brokers and Service 6411 2 36.5 -0.37 -0.79
Operators-Nonres Bldgs 6512 1 18 -3.30 -1.03
Real Estate Agents and Mgrs 6531 1 12 2.42 0.49
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Subdivide, Dev, Ex Cemetery 6552 1 2 -3.16 -0.43
Patent Owners and Lessors 6794 3 34 0.71 -0.06
Real Estate Investment Trust 6798 10 2 0 0 0.63 0.93
Hotels and Motels 7011 1 32 5.00 1.36
Personal Services 7200 3 17 -0.38 -0.28
Advertising Agencies 7311 2 4.5 -0.35 -0.05
Direct Mail Advertising Svcs 7331 2 8.5 6.29 1.17
Equip Rental and Leasing, Nec 7359 4 14.5 4.22 0.90
Help Supply Services 7363 2 37 -3.94 -0.97
Cmp Programming, Data Process 7370 18 2 2 2 -0.76 -0.54
Prepackaged Software 7372 46 442 -0.78 -0.94
Cmp Integrated Sys Design 7373 9 146 -3.14 -1.30
Cmp Processing, Data Prep Svc 7374 3 18 1.47 0.63
Misc Business Services 7380 1 6 7.14 0.63
Detect,Guard,Armor Car Svcs 7381 2 5 -6.19 -1.54
Business Services, Nec 7389 4 54 0 .8 6 0.45
Misc Repair Services 7600 1 6 -2.27 -0.25
Motion Pic, Videotape Prodtn 7812 2 11.5 -0.84 -0 .11
Svc to Motion Picture Prodtn 7819 1 6 1.30 0.18
Motion Piet, Videotape Distr 7822 1 1 -0.24 -0 .0 2
Motion Picture Theaters 7830 1 6 90.27 6.40**
Misc Amusement and Rec Service 7990 3 44 1.74 0.67
Health Services 8000 1 7 -11.09 -0.97
Offices of Medical Doctors 8011 1 8 9.18 0.71
Skilled Nursing Care Fac 8051 2 17.5 -8.33 -4.26**
Medical Laboratories 8071 1 24 -0.89 -0.19
Home Health Care Services 8082 2 13.5 4.66 0.83
Misc Health and Allied Svc,Nec 8090 1 14 -5.87 -0.72
Educational Services 8200 4 24 1.79 0.71
Social Services 8300 2 8.5 -9.99 -1.48
Engr,Acc,Resh,Mgmt,Rel Svcs 8700 1 11 2.81 0.32
Engineering Services 8711 3 25 0.36 0.06
Account, Audit, Bookkeep Svcs 8721 1 8 6 .6 8 0.74
Coml Physical, Biologcl Resh 8731 2 34 -13.03 -2 .0 1 *
Management Services 8741 2 17 2.67 0.69
Facilities Support Mgmt Svcs 8744 1 2 -4.04 -0.26
Industrial Conglomerates 9997 2 7 -1 .6 6 -0.38
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Table 18. Intra-Industry Effects of Earnings Restatement
Value weighted Equal Weighted
Sample Obs. Average 
CAR (%)
z-stat Average 
CAR (%)
z-stat
Whole sample 508 0.160 0.039 -0.061 -0.839
High concentration 175 0.935 0.986 0.932 1.392
& High leverage
High concentration 79 0.485 0.479 -0.457 -0.484
& Low leverage
Low concentration 79 0.238 0.404 -0.642 -1.588
& High leverage
Low concentration 175 -0.794 -1.511 -0.615 -1.429
& Low leverage
High cash flow similarity 249 -0.139 -0 .1 0 0 -0.635 -1.823*
Low cash flow similarity 249 0.539 0.386 0.4453 0.474
The sample period is from January 1997 through June 2002. The total sample includes 508 
earnings restatements. For each restating firm, an equal-weighted and value-weighted peer 
portfolio is formed, respectively. A peer portfolio contains firms with the same historical SIC code 
as that of the restating firms at the announcement year. Patell (1976) test is performed to test the 
significance of the abnormal returns. The construction of the z-statistic is shown in Appendix 2. * 
denotes significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 19. Intra-Industry Effects of Earnings Restatement (S&P 500 Components)
S&P 500 Components 
Sample
Value weighted Equal Weighted
Obs. Average 
CAR (%)
z-stat Average 
CAR (%)
z-stat
Whole Sample 56 0.133 0.227 -0.326 -0.632
High concentration 18 0.301 -0.019 -0 .1 2 2 0.139
& High leverage
High concentration 10 2.176 1.107 -0.328 -0.475
& Low leverage
Low concentration 9 0.484 0.240 0.238 0.143
& High leverage
Low concentration 18 -1.346 -0.580 -0.811 -0.991
& Low leverage
High cash flow similarity 27 0.179 0.068 0.361 0.068
Low cash flow similarity 27 0.044 -1.041 -1.083 -1.041
The sample period is from January 1997 through June 2002. The sample includes 56 earnings 
restatements made by S&P 500 component companies. For each restating firm, an equal-weighted 
and value-weighted peer portfolio is formed, respectively. A peer portfolio contains firms with the 
same historical SIC code as that of the restating firms at the announcement year. Patell (1976) test 
is performed to test the significance of the abnormal returns. The construction of the z-statistic is 
shown in Appendix 2. * denotes significant at 5 percent level.
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Table 20. WLS Regressions of Peer Portfolio CARs on Industry 
Characteristics and Other Determinants
Dependent
Variable
Intercept Herfindahl
Index
Debt
/Asset
Return
Corr.
Restat.
CAR
SP500
Dummy
Adj.
R2
Peer -0.049 -0.523 0.049 -1.674 0.035 -0.023 0.230
Portfolio (-0.26) (-1 .0 0 ) (6.89**) (-2 .8 8 **) (7.06**) (-0.06)
CAR (VW)
-0.037 -0.535 0.049 -1 .6 8 6 0.035 0.235
(-0.19) (-1.04) (6.92**) (-3.02**) (7.33**)
-0.294 -0.402 0.048 -1.647 0.113
(-1.64) (-0.77) (7.58**) (-4.10**)
-0.624 -0.136 0.046 0 .1 0 2
(-3.53**) (-0.34) (7.50**)
Peer 0.362 -1.229 0.033 -2.804 0.038 0.090 0.398
Portfolio (2.03*) (3.83**) (5.71**) (-8 .2 0 **) (13.39**) (0.28)
CAR (EW)
0.363 -1.226 0.033 -2.778 0.038 0.412
(2.06*) (-3.68**) (6.08**) (-8.76**) (13.42**)
0.040 -1.127 0.032 -2.779 0.158
(0.26) (-3.74**) (5.91**) (-7.49**)
-0.535 -0.989 0.032 0.083
(-5.40**) (-2.67**) (6.56**)
The dependent variable is the CAR of the value-weighted or equal-weighted peer portfolio. The 
dependent variables are the Herfindahl index, the ratio of total debt to total assets, the correlation 
coefficient between the stock return of the restating firm and the peer portfolio, the CAR of the 
restating firm, and a dummy variable of S&P 500 component. The S&P 500 dummy is equal to 1 if 
the restating firm is a component of the S&P 500 index at the year when earnings restatement is 
made. The variance of the dependent variable is used as the weight in running the weighted least 
square regression (WLS).
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Figure 1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Restating Firms
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Figure 1 presents the cumulative abnormal returns of the restating firms in during the 63 days before and 261 days after the announcement 
day of earnings restatement. Three measures of abnormal returns are used: conventional CAAR, precision weighted CAAR, and median 
CAR. The cumulative abnormal returns at the end of -1 day are adjusted to 0 for better illustration.
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Figure 2. Relation between the Glamour/Value Stock Characteristics and the 
Stock Price Reaction to Earnings Restatement
Glamour stocks
(high past sales/eamings 
growth, low BM, 
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growth, high BM, 
high CP ratio)
,->-C
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to/
Prediction A Prediction B
The x-axis measures the glamour/value stock characteristics while the y-axis measures the stock 
price reaction to the earnings restatement announcement. The naive extrapolation hypothesis has 
two predictions about the relation between the glamour/value stock characteristics and the stock 
price reactions. Prediction A is that investors naively extrapolate past performance and they 
continue to do so after earnings restatement announcement. As a result, value stocks and glamour 
stocks will experience more negative abnormal returns than stocks with average past performance 
upon earnings restatement announcement, ceteris paribus; Prediction B is that investors naively 
extrapolate past earnings growth but they drop this behavior after earnings restatement 
announcement. Thus, glamour stocks will experience the most negative abnormal returns while 
value stocks will experience the least negative abnormal returns, ceteris paribus.
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Figure 3. Industry-Adjusted BM Ratio of Restating Firms
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Graph A plots the distribution of the adjusted-BM ratio for the 481 earnings restatements that have 
non-missing adjusted-BM ratio. Graph B plots the distribution of the adjusted-BM ratio for the 
200 earnings restatements that have non-missing adjusted-BM ratio and restatement magnitude. 
For better graphing, 11 outliners are not plotted in Graph A and 6  are not plotted in Graph B.
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Figure 4. CARs Around Earnings Restatement By Industry-Adjusted BM Ratio Decile
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The restating firms are divided into five deciles by the industry-adjusted book-to-market (BM) 
ratio, with decile 1 containing stocks with highest rank in adjusted BM ratio. CR3d and C R lld  
denote conventional cumulative abnormal return in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, respectively; 
GR3d and G R lld  are the GARCH-adjusted CAR in the (-1,1) and (-5,5) window, respectively.
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